THE SOVIET PRESENCE IS FORMALIZED AND EXPANDEDand officers,” led by Amer and Badran. Amer had until recently been a Soviet favorite.
Before he and Grechko authored the failed war plan against Israel, he had been appre-
ciated for his hard line on Yemen, and like Nasser was made a Hero of the Soviet
Union (HSU).
But now he was a liability for the Soviets, as was Badran, who had conducted
crucial talks in Moscow in the run-up to the war. They were foremost among the
officers who were embittered at the USSR’s failure to implement its promised inter-
vention, and though they were scapegoated for the June debacle they still embodied
a constant threat to expose the now-embarrassing Soviet role. Amin Howeidy, the
former officer turned politician and diplomat whom Nasser brought back as a civilian
defense minister after the Six-Day War, recalled before his death in 2009 that “the
commanders who had been responsible for the defeat ... fought fiercely to deny
responsibility. I became convinced that all [of them] had to resign.”^11
Malashenko singles out a central target of Howeidy’s purge, Lt-Gen. Salah
Mohsen, who “constantly found excuses to block the negotiations,” resorting even to
charges that there were spies for Israel among the advisers.^12 This obstacle was, how-
ever, abruptly removed in August, when in Lashchenko’s words “an event occurred
that facilitated the advisers’ introduction. This was the arrest of a group of conspira-
tors” led by Amer and Badran, who allegedly attempted a coup against Nasser.^13 On
14 September 1967, Amer reportedly poisoned himself in prison.^14
A direct Soviet role in removing Amer appears unlikely, in view of the Kremlin’s
initial caution in taking sides and reporting the plot. Rumors that Nasser was again
about to resign were taken seriously enough to bring forward Sergey Vinogradov’s
dispatch to Cairo.^15 It took several weeks and a visit to Moscow by Foreign Minister
Mahmud Riad before Soviet media hailed the coup’s failure as “a blow to imperialism.”^16
But the benefit for Moscow was immediate: all at once, Lashchenko recalled, “unfriend-
liness and overtly slanderous statements toward the USSR almost ceased. Eg yptian
generals no longer felt that the advisers were being imposed on them. At every oppor-
tunity the commander-in-chief, the war minister and even the president himself would
ask Ambassador Vinogradov, ‘why is the advisers’ arrival being delayed?’”
Now, as Malashenko relates, came Moscow’s turn to play coy. “After complex nego-
tiations, the USSR delayed signature of the agreement in order to allow the Eg yptian
side to grasp the complexity of the situation and the results of the Eg yptian army’s
defeat, and to prepare for accepting the advisers.” Lashchenko adds, somewhat
smugly, “ultimately, Nasser again submitted a formal request to expedite the advisers.
After the change in the Eg yptian leadership’s outlook was appreciated, the Soviet
government decided to accede.”
Even at the height of Eg yptian recalcitrance, “the Soviet defense minister ...
decided ... to continue practical work,” and Lashchenko’s still-small team along the
canal took credit for impressing the Eg yptian command. The chief adviser had not
delayed the selection of his apparat. In July, he had already recruited Malashenko,