THE SOVIET PRESENCE IS FORMALIZED AND EXPANDEDB. “All but pressing the button”: the Soviets and the Eilat sinking
This exploit went down in naval history as the first sinking of a warship by missile.
In the Eg yptian narrative, alongside Ras el-Ish, it marks the beginning of the 1967
defeat’s reversal. As in the land battle, the Eg yptians were eager to claim exclusive
credit, while the Soviets were torn between pride in their cutting-edge weapons
technolog y and political reticence to admit igniting a new round of violence. Nasser
decorated the commanders of two Komar missile boats that were credited for the
sinking. This was the main basis for the now-established account that it was accom-
plished by two Eg yptian boats of this smaller, older model, which had two missile
launchers each, rather than a newer, four-launcher Ossa.^22 But since the missiles were
spotted by the Eilat’s lookout only as they approached the ship, Cable correctly
noted soon after: “no outside observer could be certain that the Styx missiles had
actually been fired by Eg yptians.”^23
The prevalent assumption, which would recur time and again in the years to come,
held that the Eg yptians disregarded Soviet calls for restraint. “Western diplomats in
Moscow,” ran the initial speculations, “believe the Kremlin is concerned about the
possible consequences ... and Zakharov had gone to Eg ypt to look over the situation.”
Never mind that “Moscow Radio said the sinking ... taught the Israelis an appropriate
lesson.” A commentary in Arabic entitled “The Israeli Extremists Got What They
Deserve” endorsed Cairo’s claim that the Israeli destroyer had penetrated Eg yptian
waters.^24 Then, on 24 October, it was announced in Moscow that Zakharov had
actually been in Cairo “on an unofficial visit since Saturday [21 October]”—whereas
the first missile struck the Eilat only after 5 p.m. local time the same day.^25 So he
could not have been sent in response, and no record has emerged of the Soviets’
supposed disapproval.
Nasser told an American envoy on 2 November that he was notified about the
Eilat incident at about 6:30 p.m., after it was over.^26 Vinogradov also reported that,
when he met Nasser late that afternoon, the president “said he had just been advised
by phone that at 1700 Cairo time, an Israeli destroyer had violated UAR territorial
waters. Preliminary data stated [it] was sunk by Eg yptian missile boats.”^27 But several
later accounts from Eg yptian officers stated that the president personally authorized
the attack at midday, when the Eilat was first detected.^28 Amid preparations at such
a high level that included systems in which the vital presence of Soviet advisers has
already been noted; with two Moscow VIPs on hand to finalize an agreement giving
their men a say in any such operation, could the Soviets have been left entirely out of
the loop? An Eg yptian military spokesman appeared to protest too much when he
not only called allegations of Soviet involvement “absurd” but added: “we have not a
single foreigner in our armed forces.”^29
In Israel, recriminations soon began that the Eilat’s foray—undertaken against its
captain’s judgment—had been pointless and foolhardy. This still-unresolved contro-