THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973versy within the IDF recently led to the disclosure that Israeli intelligence intercepted
(but allegedly withheld from the Eilat’s skipper) Eg yptian signals indicating that Port
Said shore batteries and naval units had been alerted, and later—but still two to three
hours before the attack—that missile launches had been approved.^30 At the time, the
Israelis, smarting at the heavy casualties and the blow to their newly enhanced prow-
ess, were hard put to admit it was all the Eg yptians’ doing, but they were also appre-
hensive of a head-on clash with the Soviets. A leading Israeli commentator cautiously
deduced that even in the absence of conclusive evidence of direct Soviet involvement,
“clearly, the Soviets held at least some ‘advisory’ authority, [and] no local commander
could by any means have made the decision.”^31 Others went further: Israel’s Navy
commander, Shlomo Erell, declared explicitly that it was “Soviet missiles fired from
Soviet ships” but admitted that these had been “supplied to the Eg yptian navy.” An
“authoritative Israeli source” said “his government doubted Eg yptian crews had time
enough to be trained to fire the missiles.” Former Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion,
still kept abreast of developments by his many disciples in the military, “charged that
the hands that fired the missiles ... were not Eg yptian. He did not say Russians fired
the missiles, but observers said he was referring to Russians.”
In London, “unofficial defense experts held that such a successful missile firing was
beyond the talents of Eg yptian naval personnel. They said it bore the hallmark of
Russian skill.”^32 France-Soir reported that Soviet advisers based in Port Said had
planned and supervised the Eilat sinking.^33 In confidence, some Western intelligence
agencies soon claimed they had proof of this. A week after the event, West German
officials still insisted to Israeli colleagues that “Zakharov came to express displeasure
and to ensure future coordination and consultation.”^34 But by mid-December, the
Germans had reversed their initial assessment, and based on “an authoritative and
reliable source,” they were now sure that “the Soviets knew in advance about the
Eg yptian intention to fire the missiles ... and gave their full consent.”^35
An official Russian military history published in 2000 cited the affair as an exam-
ple “that many of the Eg yptian naval personnel had gained some experience in com-
bat operations even before the arrival of Soviet specialists.”^36 But as already pointed
out, there were both Soviet naval craft and advisers present in Port Said all summer.
Five years later, the Soviet military attaché in Cairo still “cited with some pride the
sinking of the Eilat, which he claimed was achieved without assistance from the
advisers”—but he did acknowledge that “some may have been present ... at the time.”^37
The naval historian Aleksandr Shirokorad has named an adviser, V.A. Goncharov,
who “was not even thanked for the world’s first use of anti-ship missiles,” and adds a
quote from the poet Pushkin to the effect that everyone was lied to. He blames the
Eg yptian Komar skippers’ incompetence for the long interval between the two mis-
sile salvos, which were meant to be simultaneous; the final missile exploded in the
water after the Eilat had already gone down. Shirokorad claims that, afterward, one
boat ran aground due to poor navigation and was refloated only after three days.^38