THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973Other recent testimonies ascribe to the Soviets an even more direct role, but their
provenance and content arouse some skepticism; over time, taking credit for the cele-
brated exploit may have become a common, but often fanciful, boast. Among others,
an anonymous posting on a Russian veterans’ website claims to record the account of a
Soviet missile-boat captain who with his crew was still breaking in their Eg yptian suc-
cessors. This officer related that he elbowed aside the boat’s nominal commander and
pressed the launch buttons, on his own authority. He and his crew were decorated only
for successful transfer of the boat, while the Eg yptians were credited for the sinking to
avoid international repercussions. This account displays accurate knowledge of the
systems involved, but it differs in many basic respects from what is otherwise known—
for instance, it claims that the boat was based at Alexandria, and that it attacked the
Eilat at close range while on patrol on the open sea.^49
A retired Croatian naval officer, Kuzma Pecotić, has claimed that at least one of
the boats involved was an Ossa, which had been only nominally handed over to Eg ypt
in 1967 but was withdrawn by the Soviets the following year and sold to Yugoslavia,
where Pecotić received it from a Soviet crew. Documentation that the Yugoslavs
discovered on board stated that this boat, while still Soviet-manned, had sunk the
Eilat, and Pecotić’s Soviet counterpart confirmed this to him “after a lot of cognac.”^50
Unlike the various Russian versions, this one is hardly suspect of self-glorification, but
it remains unconfirmed. However, when more than two years later, in December
1969, two regular Soviet divizyons of shore-based anti-ship missiles were positioned
to bolster Alexandria’s coastal defenses, an expert still had to be dispatched to train
Eg yptian crews in the system’s operation, even though some of them had already
undergone training in the USSR.^51
The United States, absorbed in negotiating what would on 22 November become
Security Council Resolution 242, did not protest the sinking. The CIA actually
endorsed Cairo’s version that the Eilat had entered Eg yptian waters. Israeli Foreign
Minister Abba Eban told American interlocutors in Washington on the morning of
23 October that “the Israeli government found itself asking ... what is the extent of
Soviet involvement? Do the Eg yptians feel they are operating under the cover of
Soviet protection?” but nonetheless, “Israel would prefer to deal with this incident as
a matter between them and the Eg yptians.”^52 As Rusk said “off the record,” he felt like
telling Eban, “we’re not anxious to come over there and fight the Soviets for you.”
Publicly, the State Department “steered clear of any comment other than an expres-
sion of regret, and spokesman McCloskey said: ‘I am not assessing the blame.’”^53 A
letter from Johnson to Kosygin deplored this act of war but did not mention even the
Soviet provenance of the missiles, let alone any direct Soviet involvement.^54
The Americans soothed the Israelis with a confidential assurance that the Sixth
Fleet was sent toward the Eastern Mediterranean. But the editors of FRUS found no
record that such action was in fact taken. Ten days later, Israeli diplomat Ephraim
Evron suggested leaking the supposed naval move: “an unaccredited story in the