The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

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THE SOVIET PRESENCE IS FORMALIZED AND EXPANDED

[Washington] Post or [New York] Times would be helpful both with the Israelis and
with American Jews.” Planting stories was no monopoly of Novosti or Al-Ahram. But
Johnson’s response was “no, no, no! This starts trouble with Russia.”^55
However, the Eilat sinking was credited with driving home what the massive
Soviet resupply effort had not quite achieved for Israel in Washington. The day after
Eban’s talks, McCloskey announced that the United States was lifting the arms
embargo it had clamped on the Middle East—effectively, on Israel—since the June
war.^56 This not only went a step further toward cementing the superpower alignment
in the Israeli–Eg yptian conflict; it would have a decisive impact on direct Soviet
involvement. The first batch of A-4 Skyhawk attack planes, which had already been
contracted for before the June war, was delivered on 29 December 1967 and would
enable Israel’s “flying artillery” campaign in the summer of 1969. It also opened the
way for the crucial supply of F-4 Phantoms—the two main triggers for the massive
intervention of Soviet forces.


C. Lashchenko overhauls the Eg yptian military on the Soviet model


The agreement signed during Sokolov’s visit in October 1967 formally created several
thousand new slots for Soviet advisers. In practice, their gradual arrival had continued
throughout the summer, as necessitated by weapons deliveries as well as operational
demands. For instance, in September, six Tu-16Ts were transferred to Cairo-West,
when “under supervision of Soviet instructors, Eg yptian crews began training flights
on them. By the beginning of the 1973 war the Eg yptian Tu-16 crews were already
adequately prepared for combat missions.”^57
The agreement now signaled the dispatch of advisers in larger numbers—1,200 by
the end of November, for an estimated total of 2,500 by the end of 1967.^58 Karpov,
the artillery expert enlisted by Lashchenko, finally reached Cairo with a group of the
advisers’ top brass on 4 November. He noted in his journal that several colleagues had
arrived “some time before,” including an HSU (Hero of the Soviet Union), Col.
Pavel A f a n a s’e v.
This group’s arrival had considerable symbolic value, as it included senior advisers to
the Eg yptian General Staff, corps and division commanders. It was led by Lt-Gen. Ivan
Katyshkin, Lashchenko’s deputy and eventual successor, and Maj.-Gen. Evgeny
Malashenko, the designated adviser to the Eg yptian Army’s chief of staff.^59 They lost no
time in demanding respect for their newly enhanced authority and—Soviet egalita-
rianism notwithstanding—living conditions commensurate with their rank. As
Malashenko recalled,


We were billeted at the Victoria Hotel, as houses and apartments earmarked for the advis-
ers were not yet ready. The hotel was not of the best: dark, damp, and even the shower was
shared and worked intermittently. There was a large service staff, but no cleanliness or
order, and an amazing abundance of roaches even in the restaurant. We, the senior officers,
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