The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973

At Ismailia, he was dismayed by the laxity of discipline and readiness, with soldiers
not even bearing arms except in the fortifications close to the canal bank. Artillery
and tanks were positioned ineffectively and without proper camouflage, even though
the units had been holding the line for half a year and there were already Soviet advis-
ers attached to brigade and division commanders. “Numerous soldiers were idling,
cooking or washing underwear in the canal instead of improving their emplace-
ments.” The officers needed advice even in trivial matters: “I was told that command-
ers do not update data, as they do not want to make out new graphs. I suggested using
a pencil instead of an ink marker. They had not thought of that.”
The Soviet glossary of military terminolog y gives the following definition for
“adviser” (as distinct from “consultant”):

a serviceman, usually drawn from the officer corps, who is sent by mutual agreement from

one state to another to extend assistance in constructing armed forces, preparing military

cadres, training troops, and implementation of weaponry and equipment purchased by the

[assisted] state from the other; and sometimes to assist in the organization and conduct of

combat operations.^67

As imparted to Karpov’s group of advisers, the agreement for their deployment
included a clause that reflected precisely this aspect: quasi-command status and com-
bat readiness. “The adviser bears the same responsibility as the commander for the
troops’ combat training.” Lashchenko clarified to the new arrivals “that if a war
began, the advisers would go into battle with their advisees.” Karpov’s diary—which
is unusually critical both for its Soviet-era time of writing and for its publication date,
2009—reflects some resentment at this instruction. “Whoever wrote that into the
agreement did not think about our people. This was not our war. We swore allegiance
to our Motherland. They should have written that ‘all the adviser’s recommendations
must be implemented without question.’ That would have been more correct.”^68
As Lashchenko recalled, “news of the Soviet advisers’ arrival spread quickly and
aroused varying reactions. In the [field] units the Soviet forces were received courte-
ously, with traditional Arab hospitality, and sometimes even cordially.” But some
officers treated them with increasing suspicion, especially in respect of sharing infor-
mation that might expose their own incompetence, and resented having their errors
pointed out—which some advisers did too bluntly. After understanding this motiva-
tion, the advisers tried to overcome it by exchanging information about the enemy
and explaining that they were there voluntarily to help Arab friends repel aggression.
This took a week or two, and afterward the relationship grew stronger as work con-
tinued. But Lashchenko’s complaint that progress was hobbled by habits going back
to British times was exemplified by the Eg yptians’ insistence on addressing the advis-
ers as “Mister.”