THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973Nasser actively supported the idea of a visit by a Soviet squadron to the UAR, and
expressed his gratitude. ... Together with the entry of Soviet ships ... [this] would have reso-
nance throughout the Arab world. ... but he expressed doubts about Iran, with which the
UAR’s relations are strained, and under US pressure might refuse ... still, he would try
through the Iraqi government to obtain the Shah’s consent, under the pretext that the
planes were going [only] to Iraq.As a backup, Nasser proposed reactivating the July airlift’s flight path over
Yugoslavia. Vinogradov’s demurral reflected the Soviets’ ulterior motive: exploring
an equivalent alternative to crossing Turkish airspace. Besides, as in the airlift, the
MiG-21 simply did not have the range to fly from Yugoslavia without refueling. “The
route via Yugoslavia has already been used more than once, and so the Iranian route
presents a certain interest.” Nasser responded that he actually meant a return of the
Soviet Tu-16s, “which would create a greater impression.”^74 If he did put out feelers
toward Iran, they were rebuffed, as the Tu-16 option materialized two weeks later—
via Hungary. Somehow, West German experts interpreted the bombers’ arrival as a
demonstration of Soviet readiness to defend Eg ypt, “in view of the increasing tension”
between them.^75
Meanwhile, the Soviets repeatedly delayed the vote on a Middle East resolution at
the UN Security Council, initially by floating their own draft that would demand an
immediate Israeli withdrawal to the pre-5 June lines. Failing that, they held out for a
statement that would define “territories” (which the intentionally ambiguous British
draft required Israel to evacuate) as “the territories”—that is, all the territories—that
were occupied by Israel in June. American efforts were focused on preventing this,
which caused uncertainty to the last moment over whether the Soviets would support
the resolution.^76 In the vote on 22 November, they did—but never conceded the “all
territories” point; it would figure in diplomatic wrangling for years. Most notably, at
the Moscow summit of May 1972, US acquiescence in the Soviet interpretation
would be extracted as a concession in return for reducing the Soviet military presence
in Eg ypt.
On 1 December 1967, one of two Israeli Vautour IIb jets was shot down while on
a reconnaissance mission over the northeastern tip of the Gulf of Suez, where a new
Eg yptian SAM-2 site was under construction—undoubtedly under Soviet supervi-
sion. The Israelis attributed the loss to anti-aircraft gunfire, but a biography of Chief
of Staff Riad states that he had decided to test the missile technolog y provided by the
Soviets, and this success led to the subsequent effort to construct a dense SAM array
along the canal.^77 The plane crashed into shallow water off the coast. The other Israeli
pilot reported sighting a parachute, and Al-Ahram reported two.^78 But Israeli rescuers
found no trace of the two crewmen on site, except for one of their helmets. During
the night, the Israelis noted constant movement of vehicle headlights from the SAM
site down to the beach. The Vautour had been jointly developed by France and Israel
as a nuclear-capable bomber after the USSR threatened both countries with a missile