The Convergence of Judaism and Islam. Religious, Scientific, and Cultural Dimensions

The Case of the Kuhlānī Synagogue in San ̔ā’, 1933–1944 r 133

“Never before in history has there been heard a claim of ‘public property’
concerning the synagogues of the Jews.”^36 The judge, Husayn Abū Tālib,
was in a difficult position, caught between Imām Yahyā and the majority
of Muslim jurists. He usually sided with the latter.
In June, Husayn al- ̔Amrī met with Imām Yahyā a second time to pro-
test his position on the synagogue issue. Yahyā interrupted him with a
paraphrase of Quran 5:42, a proof-text for the right of non-Muslims to ap-
peal to Muslim courts: “If they come to you, judge between them by what
has been commanded.”^37 The imām reiterated his point that the property
which the Jews claimed to be a waq f was not a waq f because they did not
perform acts pleasing to God (see appendix). “If, however, they claim
ibāhah before us, we must accept it. Even if we know that it is a waq f for
them, the principal thing is what they claim before us.”^38
On July 10, 1935, Yahyā sent a telegram to the Dor De ̔ah faction. He
was clearly exasperated with them. “We have written enough [on this is-
sue] to satisfy a donkey—the point is the division of the synagogues in
pious trust (qismat al-kanā ̓is al-mawqūfah).”^39 In the telegram the imām
mistakenly described the synagogues as having waq f status. Realizing that
the imām’s wording would do them (and him) more harm than good,
the Dor De ̔ah camp did not mention it.^40 In August 1936, according to
al-Jamal, the Imām made the same mistake, using the word “waq f” in
reference to the synagogues issue.^41 This may show that Imām Yahyā was
not particularly exercised over such terminology.^42
Soon after the imām’s telegram was sent, the officiating judge, Husayn
Abū Tālib, declared in court that it is impossible for Jewish law not to have
a law of waq f and that Zaydī law cancels the Jewish law. He tried to force
an end to the controversy by demanding that notable Jews affiliated with
the Dor De ̔ah faction swear that the synagogues were waq fs. He likely
saw this as a way to call their bluff—that is, no matter how ingenious the
claim of “public property,” they really believed that synagogues were pi-
ous endowments. After they swore that the synagogues were pious trusts,
the Muslim court would annul the claim of waq f and those Jews claiming
private ownership would win.^43
Thus began a dramatic battle of oaths. Since Imām Yahyā agreed in
principle that synagogues could be “public property,” he demanded that
the pro-kabbalah faction swear that the synagogues were private prop-
erty.^44 Each side demanded that the other swear to a losing proposition: