The Convergence of Judaism and Islam. Religious, Scientific, and Cultural Dimensions

The Case of the Kuhlānī Synagogue in San ̔ā’, 1933–1944 r 135

Aside from its intrinsic value as a good story, the controversy over the
Kuhlānī Synagogue illuminates the issue of the interaction between Mus-
lims and non-Muslims in the framework of Islamic law. R. al-Jamal took
pride in the legal fiction he had thought up to escape the ban on non-
Muslim waq fs. He trusted that this fiction played a role in bettering the
lot of the Jews. However, while he was assembling documentation of the
controversy in preparation for his emigration to Palestine, he discovered
that he had not been the first person to skirt the issue of non-Muslim pi-
ous endowments by using the term “public property” (ibāhah).
A copy of an 1866 fatwā, obtained by R. al-Jamal from the rabbi of a vil-
lage south of San ̔ā’, describes that town’s synagogue as “public property.”^53
The scribe who copied the document in 1936 notes that he did not recog-
nize the judge’s signature. Therefore, the judge who wrote this document
is unknown. According to the document, two brothers who had owned
the synagogue

made it into public property (abāhū) to their satisfaction and of

their own free will with a designation of public property (ibāhatan)

from which there is no recourse. There is nothing to prevent a Jew

who wants to pray there from praying, nor is there any shame, harm,

or cause for worry in this. None of the Jews are to squander [its

resources] or to let it fall into disrepair. Instead it should remain

public property (mubāhah) for prayer, without any selling, buying,

or inheritance of it.^54

The formulation above, written by a Muslim judge, stated the case for
synagogues’ status as public property in a stronger manner than R. al-
Jamal had stated in court. Therefore, al-Jamal did not merely pull the wool
over the eyes of powerful Muslims. Rather, a pragmatic understanding of
the interaction between Muslim and Jewish legal systems undergirded his
ostensible ruse. That this logic was apparent to Muslims who dealt in this
gray area explains both the Muslim judge’s ruling of public property above
and Imām Yahyā’s sympathy toward R. al-Jamal’s legal fiction.
The case of the Kuhlānī Synagogue forced Muslim jurists to grapple
with the question: What is Jewish law? If Jews have a legal institution that
resembles a Muslim waq f in every respect, is it a waq f? If so, and seeing
that a waq f is forbidden to them, what is to be done about a putative waq f
of the Jews? What Imām Yahyā and the anonymous judge had in common