The Divergence of Judaism and Islam. Interdependence, Modernity, and Political Turmoil

(Joyce) #1
Jews and Turks in Germany after 9/11 · 95


  1. See “Milli Görüş’e John Destegi,” Sabah, 10 July 1999; “Geld für Islam-
    Unterricht,” Berliner Morgenpost, 21 September 2002; Ulf Häußler, “Muslim
    Dress Codes in German State Schools,” European Journal of Migration and Law
    3 (2001): 457–74. In the school year 2002/2003, 1,607 students in Berlin (852
    girls, 805 boys) took Islam as a religion course in Berlin; 74 percent of them
    were of Turkish nationality; 21 percent were Arabs. See Islamische Föderation
    in Berlin, “Aktuelle Daten über den IRU für das Schuljahr” (2004), http://www.
    islamische-foederation.de/IRU.htm; “Die Kopftuch Schule,” Die Tageszeitung,
    24 June 2004.

  2. At issue was the following: A German schoolteacher of Afghan origin,
    Feresteh Ludin, insisted on wearing the hijab in the school. When she was fired,
    she complained that she was being discriminated against on the grounds of her
    religious beliefs. When her case was brought before the Bundesverfassungsg-
    ericht (the constitutional court of Germany,) it ruled that “Germany’s constitu-
    tional law did not explicitly forbid the wearing of headscarves in the classroom
    in state-run schools.” The court then left it up to the individual Länder to legally
    enact a ban on wearing the headscarf in schools. Some of the Länder have now
    outlawed the headscarf.

  3. “German States Move to Enact Headscarf Bans,” Deutsche Welle, 25 Sep-
    tember 2003.

  4. Y. Michal Bodemann, “Unter Verdacht: Parallelgesellschaften und Anti-
    Islamismus,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 20 November 2004; Gökçe Yurdakul, “Secu-
    lar versus Islamist: The Headscarf Debate in Germany,” in Politics of Visibility:
    Young Muslims in European Public Spaces, ed. Gerdien Jonker and Valerie Ami-
    raux (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2006).

  5. Evrensel Daily Newspaper, European edition, “Yüksek mahkemeden kur-
    bana vize çıktı,” 16 January 2002; Islamische Gemeinde Milli Görüs, “Brandan-
    schlag auf muslimischen Schlachtbetrieb,” 26 November 2004, http://www.
    igmg.de.

  6. The name Milli Görüş refers to the political ideology created by the
    Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party) in Turkey during the 1970s. Because
    of its religious activities that threaten public order, political parties that are
    associated with Milli Görüş ideology were banned by the constitutional court
    in Turkey. Milli Görüş appeared as a diasporic network of Turkish Muslims
    in Europe, specifically in Germany. However, it has a big disadvantage: it is
    listed with the Bundesverfassungsschutz (the intelligence agency of Germany)
    as a “threat” to German democracy. They are seen as part of political Islam,
    which prevents immigrants from achieving full integration into German soci-
    ety. See Werner Schiffauer, “Das Recht, anders zu sein,” Die Zeit, 18 November

  7. The report states that Milli Görüş pursues anti-integrative efforts, spe-
    cifically on Islamic education of children. Moreover, the report provides many
    examples from the statements of the Milli Görüş publications, specifically anti-
    German and anti-Semitic statements in the Milli Gazete. The label of “threat”
    to German democracy largely restricts Milli Görüş activities and campaigns

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