The Moroccan Nationalist Movement and Its Attitude toward Jews and Zionism · 169nation, he also stated, at the end of 1958, that Jews must be returned to
their traditional dhimmi status in Morocco, not, of course, in a humiliat-
ing or degrading and inferior sense, but as part of the maintenance of a
sound, intact social order and as “foreigners.”^26 Other leaders in the party
considered the Jews “an electoral asset” and as “potential partners of the
national interest in the time of post-colonization.”^27
In his different addresses, al-Fassi added to and clarified the strong
bond between the Moroccan nation and other Arab nations: Morocco,
he asserted, is linked to the other Arab nations by love based on decades
of affiliations. “The Arab spirit,” as he calls it, provides Morocco with
strength and confers upon it the right to be included in the brotherhood
of Arab nations. It is interesting that despite being an enthusiastic reli-
gious exhorter, a modernist, and a religious reformist, al-Fassi accepted
the division of the Middle East and the Maghreb into “nation-states.” He
does not challenge the fact that the individual countries were established
under Western influence and Western pressure, nor does he desire the
formation of a complex but unified Muslim country on the model of the
Muslim Empire of the Golden Age, as did other Islamic reformers before
him.^28
In conclusion, the image that crystallizes is one in which the leaders
of Morocco’s Nationalist parties, particularly the Istiqlal, did not clearly
differentiate between Judaism and Zionism or between religious obser-
vances and national and political identification. This lack of clarity was
also characteristic of the sultan/king, the Istiqlal’s followers, and the fa-
natic nationals of other parties who, whether for inner-party needs or po-
litical interests, frequently blurred the boundaries between the two. It is
reasonable to assume that the polarization and distancing that occurred
between the various Moroccan native bodies and the Jewish community
was caused by the strong reverberations of political developments—
those occurring both within Morocco itself and elsewhere.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the leaders of the conservative wing of the
Istiqlal, headed by ̔Allal al-Fassi, voiced resolute support for both Nass-
er’s policy and that of the Arab League concerning inter-Arab issues.
Morocco became active in the struggle against Israel; they received the
League’s “Jerusalem File” and convened inter-Arab meetings concern-
ing the issues. However, the involvement with internal problems did
not leave the Moroccan Nationalists enough maneuvering space in the
arena of inter-Arab and international issues. They made do by openly