Introduction · 13Mollov maintains that a religiously based intercultural dialogue is imper-
ative to effect perception moderation. It is the best outlet to alter narrow-
minded Israeli and Palestinian perceptions by emphasizing the common-
alities of Judaism and Islam. Mollov’s argumentation is invigorated by
empirical findings, for he and his colleagues have been actively involved
in meetings with religious Palestinian Muslims.
The debate about the Arab-Israeli conflict and its resolution is by no
means monopolized by the Palestinians and Israel’s neighboring states.
Over the years it extended to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Iran, and
Turkey. Despite geographical remoteness, political leaders of Arab Libya
often exceed the role of mere spectators, as is abundantly evident from
Yehudit Ronen’s study on Libya, “Zionism and Judeo-Islamic Relations
in the Middle East: Libya’s Ideological and Political Position.”
Ronen focuses entirely on the post-1969 revolutionary period of the
inter-Arab arena and Israel. No organized Jewish communities remain
in Libya at this time. In many ways, Judeo-Muslim relations may be de-
fined here as “Jewish Israel and the Muslim world.” Attention is shifted
to the revolutionary regime’s attitudes toward world Jewry and Israel.
If until the 1990s Mu ̔ammar al-Qadhafi attacked “world Zionism” and
denied Israel’s right to exist, this perception has evolved to some degree
since then. In 1993 Qadhafi encouraged Libyan Jews who left their home-
land in the 1950s and 1960s to return and promised to indemnify them
for properties expropriated in the past. Although nothing emerged from
these declarations, a less radical attitude toward Jews, Israel, and Zion-
ism became evident in the post–cold war era. The weakened position
of the Russian ally, the determination to end Libya’s international isola-
tion, the desire to mend fences with the United States, and the influence
of Saif al-Islam, Qadhafi’s dynamic and well-educated son, all explain
this new strategy, which in any case lacks clarity. Saif al-Islam became
the spokesperson of the Libyan regime’s “new face.” He raised issues of
Judeo-Muslim coexistence and their historic meanings, identified with
Jewish sufferings over the Holocaust, and treated the Arab-Israeli con-
flict less emotionally. Nevertheless, as long as contradictory statements
emanate from Libya, insisting on the transformation of Israel into a bi-na-
tional state for Palestinians and Jews, rather than backing the idea of the
two-state solution, the feasibility for change is remote. As Libyan politics
manifested great unpredictability in the past four decades, and in light of