HOW DID THEY DO IT?
This brings me back to my initial question. How did they do it?
What I mean is this. Despite their limited resources, Hittite kings
managed to build an empire which at its peak in the fourteenth and
thirteenth centuries stretched from the western coast of Anatolia,
right across the Anatolian peninsula to the Euphrates river, and
down south through Syria as far as the northern frontier of
Damascus. It was a kingdom made up of a myriad of disparate
vassal states which largely retained their independence in their local
affairs, and often rebelled against Hittite overlordship. How did the
rulers of Hatti keep control of this vast region, while still ensuring
that their homeland had sufficient troops to defend it when the
main army was on campaign? They had also to ensure that Hatti’s
foodlands remained productive to their maximum capacity. Food
production was a highly labour-intensive activity, and would be
seriously affected if a large proportion of the land’s agricultural
workforce were reassigned to military service–especially at peak
periods of the agricultural year. We’ve estimated the size of the
Hittitefighting force, including reservists, at around 50,000 or not
much more, plus subject-state levies. Not a large number when you
look at the vast territory over which Hatti’s armed forces were
expected to maintain control. Back then to our question. How did
they do it?
Let’s begin with a brief consideration of the logistics of a
campaign. One of the most important of these was ensuring that
your troops had enough food and drink to sustain them on their
marches, often through arid and semi-arid lands, sometimes
occupied by enemy populations or populations sympathetic to
them. Basic food supplies were brought from the homeland. They
consisted primarily of rations offlour and bread (called‘soldier-
bread’) packed into oxen- or horse-drawn carts forming part of the
baggage train, or carried in sacks slung over the backs of donkeys.
These supplies were supplemented by the contents of food silos,
called‘seal houses’, which were built on a number of campaign
routes, at strategic intervals within the subject-territories, for
reprovisioning both the army and its animals. Provisions were also
176 WARRIORS OF ANATOLIA