than if it had been structured on more clear-cut ethnic lines. As far
as we’re aware, issues of racial discrimination or claimed racial
superiority over newcomers by longer established elements in the
homeland never arose. And apart from the rebellion of the
thousands of prisoners-of-war early in the fourteenth century (see
Chapter 7), the deportees assigned to the agricultural workforce
and military service seem to have adapted fairly readily, perhaps
under a great deal of compulsion, to their new lives. At least we
hear nothing to the contrary.
But while attempting to answer our question‘How did they do
it?’,let’saskanotherone:‘Were there times when they tried to
avoid doing it?’ Though royal ideology required a king to
demonstrate his prowess as a military leader with impressive
conquests and stacks of plunder, and though a warrior culture was
deeply embedded in Hittite society, the Great Kings of Hatti often
committed themselves to military ventures beyond their home-
landonlywhen they appear to have had no other option. They
were well aware of the costs and risks that these enterprises
entailed. Particularly so, given the limited manpower on which
they could draw, and the necessity of doing so without seriously
affecting the supply of able-bodied men available for working the
land and for other major projects, like the construction and
maintenance of city fortifications.
These considerations help explain why Hittite kings some-
times seemed excessively indulgent in their treatment of wayward
vassals, and in their attempts to come to terms with regional
insurrectionists rather than take military action against them.
We’ve seen in Chapter 8 how reluctant two successive Hittite
kings were to use military force against their manipulative,
treacherous protégé Madduwatta, even though he was consorting
with the enemy and building a small empire of his own in the
west. Later, the western renegade Piyamaradu defied Hittite
authority repeatedly, until a Hittite king, probably Hattusili III,
was forced to lead a campaign against him; even while on the
march, Hattusili tried unsuccessfully to end Piyamaradu’s
insurrectionist activities in Hatti’s western states by diplomatic
rather than military means.
178 WARRIORS OF ANATOLIA