Michael Speransky. Statesman of Imperial Russia, 1772–1839 - Marc Raeff

(Chris Devlin) #1
REFORM OF RUSSIA'S FINANCES AND CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION 93

been found for them first. For, as Speransky has argued earlier, new

expenditures of the state will benefit the country only if they are a

consequence of the development of the country's industry and
productivity. For extraordinary expenses the government should have
at its disposal, instead of reserves of money, the means of obtaining

additional revenue if and when needed. 1 Today such suggestions seem

obvious, but never before had they been stated so clearly to a Russian
Emperor. In so doing, Speransky was extending to the domain of public
finance the principles of administrative and economic "rationality"
prevailing in private enterprises.
The preceding summary of sections of the Financial Plan shows that
Speransky is well aware of the truth of the dictum, "pauvre pays,
pauvre roi." 2 An essential and organic part of his financial reforms
is concerned with the fostering of economic activity and business
enterprise in Russia. Speransky's Plan develops further some of the
ideas stated in the Report of the Minister of the Interior for 1803
(d. Chapter 3). Together with the opponents of mercantilism and
state monopolies, Speransky does not believe that the government
should have exclusive control over any aspect of economic activity or
source of wealth. The state should not hamper the free play of individual
enterprise and intitiative by its own unfair competition. Therefore,
the Russian government should give up its monopoly of the salt trade.
The Treasury's revenue will not suffer from it, for the monopoly can
be more than adequately replaced by a production tax. Chances are
that with free circulation of the commodity, the turnover will be
greater, production will increase and the tax on it yield more. Similarly,
the farming out of alcohol sales should be replaced by an excise tax.
Nor should the state attempt to have its own factories, except those
few which might be essential for military purposes. State factories are
not advantageous to the government because of their inefficiency and
low productivity. At the same time they create unfair competition for
individual entrepreneurs who could do the job much better. 3 Further-
more, the government should not make any demands on the labor and
time of its citizens, barring emergencies, of course. The Plan, therefore,


1 Plan Finansov, Sees. 46, 51, 66, 70, 72, 78, 82, 94, pp. 13-19.
2 Speranskii, "Ob uchrezhdeniiakh otnosiashchikhsia do ekonomii." Arkhiv
istoricheskikh i prakticheskikh svedenii, (1859), No.6, pp. 13-21 passim. After
listing the sources of the power (sily) of the state (moral forces, intellectual forces,
individual physical forces, natural forces [natural resources], labor forces) and of
the government (justice and order, strength of government institutions, military
forces, unmovable state property, fiscal resources), he concludes that the strength
(power) of the government is based on the wealth of the state (pp. 13-14).
3 Plan Finansov, Sees. lll, 112, 113, p. 24.

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