REFORM OF RUSSIA'S FINANCES AND CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION 101Speransky saw clearly and correctly Russia's financial problem and
the desirable goal of her economic development. However, in suggesting
concrete policies to deal with the situation, he proved inadequate. He
had learned, and he fully understood, the best· available theories of
his time, theories which even in the West had not gained full
acceptance. It would be unfair to criticize him, therefore, for having
held certain conceptions that have been abandoned by economic
science since. For instance, he failed to envisage the possibility that the
raising of the country's economic potential would be a more effective
means for absorbing the excess of assignats than their conversion into
a fixed state debt. It might be added, however, that Speransky clearly
saw that conversion was only a first step which must be followed and
supported by a general raising of the nation's economy. But the greatest
weakness of his Financial Plan was that he did not take into considera-
tion the conditions under which he had to operate: Russia's economic
and social backwardness, the critical political situation presented by
the ever-renewed international conflicts. His was too much of a doc-
trinaire approach which disregarded the practical feasibility, within a
reasonable time, and within the existing social and political framework,
of his proposals for financial and economic reorganization and reform.
In the final analysis, Speransky's goal was that of the laisser-faire,
free trade, individualistic theorists of the early 19th century. But he
still shared with the enlightened absolutists and Physiocrats the belief
that the state had to take positive action in guiding and educating the
nation towards this goal. In other words, the road that led to freedom
and individualism in economic life had to be travelled in conveyances
provided and administered by the state. In taking this fundamentally
bureaucratic approach, Speransky did not seem to realize that the
means chosen might defeat the ends. This particular blind spot of his
was inherited by successive ministers throughout the 19th century,
down to the very end of the Imperial regime. 1
As for the implementation of Speransky's Financial Plan, it was
approved by the Emperor after it had received a favorable recommenda-
tion from the Department of State Economy of the Council of State.
Speransky, then State Secretary and at the height of his influence,
proceeded to implement the various measures he had proposed. The
aims of the Plan were made public by the decree of February 2, 1810
(PSZ 24,116) which ordered the following steps: the assignats were
recognized as a state debt and their eventual complete redemption1 Cf. Khromov, op. cit., p. 131, note 2 (Bogolepov, Gosudarstvennyi Dolg, 1910,
p. 405).