REFORM OF RUSSIA'S FINANCES AND CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION 105only a few weeks after it had been floated. By May 1811, when·it was
Closed, the loan had produced 6.5 millions rubles, a good figure, but
much less than had been hoped for. The sale of state lands went even
less satisfactorily. The buyers were few, even after the terms of purchasehad been liberalized in 181 I. In any case, even if Speransky's measures
had been more successful, it is quite doubtful that Russia's finances
would have been put on a healthy basis, because no normal system
could have proved adequate to the economic and financial burdens of
the French invasion and the wars of 1812-1815. After some improve-
ment - due to the psychological effects produced by Speransky's
measures - the assignats sank to their lowest level during the campaign
against Napoleon. The deficit reached such proportions that even the
English subsidies could not make up for it. Lastly, the destructions
wrought by the invasion undermined the very foundations of finan-
cial recovery and "saddled" the government with additional expen-
ditures in the form of compensations for war damages.
In spite of the apparent failure of his Plan, Speransky's efforts did
not remain entirely without beneficial effect on the country. Of more
permanent significance than the temporary improvement in the value
of assignats was the orderly organization of the financial administration:
consolidation of the entire state debt under one authority, clear
division of functions in the Ministry of Finance, the establishment of
uniform methods of accounting and of a Chief Accounting Division,
preparation of complete yearly budgets. Most important of all, however,
was the fact that Speransky brought a fresh and modern outlook on
the nation's economy and finances to the musty offices of the Imperial
government. This new outlook - whatever its theoretical merit and
immediate practical benefit - became an active element which
influenced later projects, reform measures, and governmental policies
towards agriculture and industry.
- THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION
The ambitious program of Russia's financial and economic rehabil-
itation needed, in Speransky's view, the guiding hand of an efficiently
organized administration. An administration which possessed singleness
of purpose and continuity of. policy was something that Russia sadly
lacked at the time. The executive branch of the government had
neither purposefulness nor unity and clearly defined responsibility. The
replacement by the Ministries of the chaotic and haphazard system of
the central administration inherited from the 18th century had not