108 REFORM OF RUSSIA'S FINANCES AND CEN'l'RAL ADMINISTRATION
ministries as they had been set up in 1802. These institutions, in
Speransky's opinion, suffered from three major faults: insufficient
responsibility of the individual ministers, lack. of precision and pro-
portion in the distribution of affairs among the ministries, inadequate
rules of procedure. The first, lack of even individual responsibility of
the ministers for their acts, was the most serious defect. An individual
minister could take arbitrary action and then seek refuge in the fact
that he was a "physical eX,tension" of the autocratic Emperor. Under
such circumstances, the success of any effort at correcting the abuse or
bringing the official to account was very doubtful. 1
The first step towards reform, taken at the behest of Speransky,
consisted in an apportioning of the various areas of governmental con-
cern among the existing ministries on the basis of some clear and
logical scheme. This was done by the decree of July 25, 1810 (PSZ
24,307) on a preliminary basis, until such time as the statutes of all
the ministries were completed. The wording of the decree clearly set
forth the purpose and character of the reform: "The real significance of
these additions [to the statute of the Ministries of 1802] consists in
that they: introduce a better distribution of business, establish a higher
degree of uniformity [of procedure], shorten and facilitate the processing
of business, set precisely the limits of the power and obligations [of
the ministries], and thereby enable the executive to carry out the laws
more speedily and accurately." 2 The government's business was to
be arranged logically and naturally under five main headings: 1. exter-
nal relations, 2. the establishment for external security, 3. state economy,
- organization of criminal and civil justice, 5. the establishment for
internal security. The areas of competence of the major ministries and
administrations were to be 'assigned along these same lines, with the
result that the following list was drawn up: 1. Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 2. Ministries of War and Navy, 3. Ministries of the Interior,
1 It may be observed that Speransky's argumentation parallels fully that made
by Freiherr vom Stein in his "Darstellung der fehlerhaften Organisation des Cabinets
und der Nothwendigkeit der Bildung einer Ministerialen Conferenz" (Berlin, 26/27
April 1806): "Sie [Kabinettregierung] hat aIle Gewalt, die endliche Entscheidung
aller Angelegenheiten. die Besetzung aller Stellen, aber keine Verantwortlichkeit, da
die Person des Kiinigs ihre Handlungen sanctionirt." Freiherr vom Stein, Brief·
wechsel, Denkschriften und Aufzeichnungen, vol. II, p. 77. I have not been able
to find any direct evidence that Speransky borrowed from or knew Stein's Denkschrift.
But from the point of view of chronology, and considering the very close relations
which existed between the courts of St. Petersburg and Berlin, it would have been
quite possible for Speransky to know the contents of Stein's paper. Another possible
source of information on Stein's reform proposals could have been provided by
Prussian dignitaries and officials who took refuge in Russia after Jena and Tilsit
(Stein himself came to Russia only in 1812).
2 PSZ, 24,307 (p. 278 of vol. 31).