Michael Speransky. Statesman of Imperial Russia, 1772–1839 - Marc Raeff

(Chris Devlin) #1
PLANS OF REFORM 149

breaking the bureaucracy's domination over the judiciary, it delegates
judicial responsibility to citizens themselves belonging to the jurisdiction

of the court. It is a qualified form of judgment by one's peers. The


judicial hierarchy of the Empire is topped by the Senate which serves
as the highest tribunal of the land. The Senate will be composed of
two civil and two criminal departments, one of each in the two capitals
of St. Petersburg and Moscow. The Senate reviews the transactions of
the lower courts to check whether all procedural forms have been
properly observed. In case of error - as determined by a reketmeister
(maitre de requetes) - the case is referred back to the lower courts.
This function of procedural review, as contrasted to the American
judicial review, is patterned after the French Conseil d'Etat. The Senate
also acts as the last instance of appeal - besides the Emperor, of
course. The members of the Senate are appointed by the Emperor
from a list of candidates drawn up by the Provincial Dumas and kept
up to date by the Chancellor. The decisions of the Senate are to be
announced publicly and printed for circulation to all lower courts and
government agencies. 1
In this way, Speransky's Plan aimed at separating the judicial from
the administrative functions of the government, a crying need in
Russia at the time. Of all the practical suggestions embodied in the
Plan of 1809, those pertaining to the judiciary were most likely to
contain the elements of "progressive" development. Membership, as
"jury," in courts of justice was one of the best means available for
raising the people to a higher level of civic and political consciousness.
This in turn would then serve to secure a solid foundation for a "true
monarchy." Although the proposed reorganization of the judiciary was
never carried out, and we are thus left in ignorance of how it would
have fared in "real life," it may not be amiss to point out one factor
that might have sidetracked the reform. The local "manpower" from
which the "jurymen" would be drawn was of very low calibre indeed.


It lacked the training and habit of dealing with judiciary and admin-

istrative matters. Under such conditions, the representatives of the
government, the Presidents of Courts and Procurators (i.e., "attorneys
general"), could have easily acquired preponderant roles. That such a
development was not outside the realm of possibility had been amply
demonstrated by the government's experience with the assemblies and


1 ibid., pp. 79-86 passim. Speransky is not very clear as to whether the Senate
takes up all cases in last resort, or only on appeal. Also, it would seem as if the
decisions of the Senate could still be appealed to the Emperor, a situation which
would decrease the prestige and authority of the Senate as an autonomous judicial
body.

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