Michael Speransky. Statesman of Imperial Russia, 1772–1839 - Marc Raeff

40 "CONSTITUTIONALISM"

favorite friends. 1 If Alexander was not an influenceable weakling, can

we explain the apparent contradiction by pointing to his duplicity,

his habit of "wearing" a different face for each one who approached

him? At times it is asserted in the literature on the subject that the

Emperor wore a mask of liberalism to conciliate "public opinion" and

to gain popularity. But we have pointed out that too often he went

against this opinion and that he did not fear loss of popularity. 2

To believe in Alexander's duplicity about constitutionalism is to read

his entire reign in the light of the "reactionary" measures of the

1820's and to forget that even then he was still thinking of constitutional

reform.^3 If we must speak of Alexander's duplicity, we should first

get away from the dichotomy of liberal vs. reactionary. From his earliest

days the Emperor had been put in a situation which required tactful

diplomatic maneuvering, caught as he was between the demands of his

grandmother and the duty he owed to his father. To hide his thoughts

and to evade direct answers, became second nature to him; even as
autocratic ruler, when he met with strong opposition to his plans, he
rarely met the issue head on, but preferred to reach his ends in a
roundabout way. This went well with his jealous concern for his
power, his desire to appear friendly and well disposed to all. Rather
than defend openly his position, rather than show his dislik.e or
distrust of a person frankly, he resorted to back-stage intrigues and
maneuvers. This evasiveness and indirectness coupled with suspicious
distrust for his closest advisers, created the impression of vacillation,
1 Reference to two instances may suffice here, as this is not a study of Alexander
I. Alexander followed his own policy of "friendship" with Napoleon after Tilsit,
in spite of the strong opposition of his own mother, most of his ministers, the
Court, the nobility, and the people. In 1812 he refused to end the war and
negotiate with Napoleon as long as the French were on Russian territory, and
resisted all pleas for peace of his mother, his brother, and courtiers. And after
1815, Alexander I was alone responsible for the creation and operation of the
military colonies. He insisted on their establishment and continuation even though
Arakcheev advocated their abolition after the high cost and difficulties of the
project had become apparent.
2 "11 faut Ie dire, l'empereur Alexandre n'avait point alors (1803-1804) l'opinion
russe pour lui, elle ne fut son partage que rarement pendant toute la duree de
son rcgne." Memoires du prince Adam Czartoryski, I, p. 335.
3 This distortion of perspective, particularly common among the liberals of the
1820's and the Decembrists, which divided the reign of Alexander into two antithetical
periods, is largely because most of the government's reform projects remained
unknown to contemporaries. Of course, we are quite aware that for a proper and
complete characterization of the period, we cannot dismiss the opinions of the
contemporaries, however inaccurate and erroneous they might have been. The
belief held by the generation of the 1820's that Alexander had betrayed the ideals
and principles of his youth is a historical fact of great significance for the
understanding of the origins and character of the Decembrist revolt. But this is
not directly relevant here. We wish to determine what Alexander's constitutionalism
was in fact and what the Emperor himself understood by that term; this is
essential for an appreciation of Speransky's political role.