the early modern mediterranean 97
worked vigorously and consistently to keep critical maritime routes open and as safe
as possible. They were particularly protective of the Black Sea, which had historically
been far more important in provisioning Istanbul/Constantinople than the
Mediterranean had ever been. It is true that the Ottomans extended their hegemony
all the way to Algeria, and they maintained their North African possessions until well
into the nineteenth century. However, that original venture into the western
Mediterranean was the work of free agents, corsairs from the eastern Mediterranean
who, as the frontier between Christianity and Islam dwindled in the east, sailed off to
the west in search of new adventures and opportunities. The Spanish enemy at the
other end of the sea provided such an opportunity. Once the corsairs had come to
dominate the weak North African states and offered them to the sultan, there was no
reason for him to say no.
The extension of Ottoman rule along the North-African littoral did not bring these
provinces the rich benefits of the Pax Ottomanica in the way that, say, the conquest
of the Middle East gave the city of Aleppo access to its rich Anatolian hinterland.
There was a political benefit, of course, and a significant one. Had the Ottomans not
lent their strength to the emerging beyliks of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers, the Spanish
might well have continued their Reconquista all the way into North Africa. But the
joining of the region to the eastern Islamic world did not in any way lead to the
resumption of the overland route linking Andalusia to far-away India, and back again,
that was so characteristic of the medieval Mediterranean. This was so for two reasons.
First, North Africa without access to the Iberian Peninsula was simply not a compel-
ling destination for international trade. Second, the luxury goods coming in from the
east which in prior centuries would have reached Alexandria and then turned west,
now went north instead; the new magnet was Istanbul. This is one of the reasons
(there were others) why early modern North Africa, in sharp distinction to the
medieval period, oriented itself much more towards the northern shores of the
Mediterranean. Marseilles and Livorno in particular were intimately linked to North
African trade and corsairing.
Let us return to the question of equilibrium. The Ottomans did extend their con-
trol along much of the Mediterranean littoral. They also ended a long period of
Italian hegemony in the eastern Mediterranean. This would seem to make the case for
an overall Muslim gain at the expense of Christendom. This does not really accord,
however, with other facts about the early modern Mediterranean, facts which we shall
discuss shortly. They include the entry of the Dutch and the English into the inland
sea as well as the continuing importance of European navigation across the entire
area. This inconclusiveness suggests that the issue is not one of equilibrium. Instead,
what is most striking about the Ottomans is how faithfully they re-created the
Byzantine Empire and, in so doing, reverted to patterns that were reminiscent of a
much earlier period in Mediterranean history.
Here I have in mind Valérian’s description (this volume) of the reconstitution of
Mediterranean trade networks in the ninth and tenth centuries, when maritime com-
merce developed above all within the borders of an Empire. This description rings
very true for the Ottomans as well. With the conquest of Istanbul we have a redirec-
tion of trade networks in the eastern Mediterranean, away from the international
routes pioneered by the Italians and towards a servicing of the imperial capital. Just
like the Byzantines prior to 1204, the Ottomans made the Black Sea their own. Over