132 michael herzfeld
It is hard to see where the commodification of Mediterranean (or even European)
identity will lead. For the moment, the nationalistic projects that launched the
various forms of heritage into the postmodern kaleidoscope remain surprisingly
intact, and are even reinforced by popular disgust at the economic domination of
a few northern countries over the entire region. In the eastern reaches of the
Mediterranean, moreover, nationalism has arguably been reinvigorated by a toxic
combination of poverty and resentment at Western interference. On the other
hand, both local people and tourists can see very clearly the ultimate irony (and
hence postmodern credential) of the heritage industry: that the search for unique-
ness generates a pervasive sense of homogeneity. Moreover, the speed of recent
political events all around the Mediterranean has thrown the contradictions
inherent in this aspect of heritage into sharp and sometimes painful relief. Each
nation produces the cultural specificities of its heritage policies according to a rule
book written largely in English and actuated by a common set of stereotypes and
consequent expectations. The resulting sensation of always-already-déjà-vu
reminds us that what makes the Med “po-mo” is that its modernity has always
come, repetitively and predictably, at the price of being framed as pre-modern.
Such are the constraints on existing forms of nationalism in the region, despite
increasing efforts by public intellectuals to resist that vicarious destiny. Perhaps
their dawning realization of the region’s ironic predicament will eventually sap the
more essentializing and racist nationalisms to a far greater degree than the
European Union, UNESCO, and the entire gamut of banks—which often simply
replace one essentialism with another—will ever be able to achieve.
Endnotes1 I have explored this dynamic at length in Herzfeld, 2004. The present crisis in Greece and
Italy, as well, arguably, as some of the manifestations of anomie in the aftermath of the Arab
Spring in North Africa, would seem to confirm that argument.
2 For Greek and Turkish proverbs, for example, see Τουρκική Γραμματική και Γλώσσα
E-Learning 2013, and, more extensively, Millas, 2008.
3 For an example of truly postmodern and international heritage politics, see the official
UNESCO 2013 announcement of the inscription of “the Mediterranean diet” in the
Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity.
4 I am grateful to Naor Ben-Yehoyada for bringing Hirsch’s work to my attention.
5 See, for example, the journal Mediterranean Historical Review (based at Tel Aviv University),
and the frequent appearance of the work of Israeli scholars in Mediterranean Studies
periodicals elsewhere.
6 For an especially interesting discussion of the use of Classical spolia, or decontextualized
architectural remnants, in Byzantine churches, see Papalexandrou, 2010. Brown and
Hamilakis (2003: 14) suggest that sometimes the response to ancient remains is more
passive than proactive, so that we should beware of over-interpreting the apparent
evidence for deliberate reuse. But reuse in cities such as Rome has come to constitute
part of their appeal, since it entails a layering effect that suggests a romantic historical
richness.
7 See, however, my critical response: Herzfeld, 1984: 443–446, 450.
8 For an example of such beads produced in China and marketed as “Turkish,” see Gets.cn,
2013.