A Companion to Mediterranean History

(Rick Simeone) #1

nautical technology 163


obstacle was removed with the introduction in the late thirteenth century of the
compass, the marine chart, and dead reckoning.
Interestingly, sounding weights, already introduced in the sixth century bce, were
also adopted to overcome such obstacles. Furthermore, from the late twelfth century,
the Genoese broke all the above “rules.” Ibn Jubayr’s description of his voyage in
1184 from Acre to the West on a Genoese ship is instructive. The ship left in October,
just at the beginning of the winter season. Furthermore, the captain intended to take
the direct westward route on the high seas along the unfavorable southern coast of
Crete. Sailing against the strong westerlies, the mast broke and the sails were torn
down. The Genoese had succeeded only with difficulty in reaching the south-western
end of the island when the strong westerlies pushed the vessel out to sea, where they
lost all sense of orientation. Eventually, the captain had to sail from north-eastern
Crete to the Ionian Sea and the Straits of Messina This pattern repeats itself in the
descriptions of the voyages of Jacques de Vitry to Acre in late September 1216 as well
as those of the Crusades of 1239 and of Louis IX in 1249, all made directly south
to Sicily and along the southern coast of Crete to the Levant. Although setting out
with following winds, all met strong adversary easterlies that dispersed the ships and
made life on board unbearable (Gertwagen, 2006: 99, 102–103; Broadhurst, 1952:
327–334).
Why would pilgrims like Ibn Jubayr risk such voyages? Undoubtedly, their funda-
mental fear of the sea induced them to reach their destination as quickly as possible.
One could safely imagine that Ibn Jubayr’s praise of the Genoese captain’s seafaring
skills in fact repeated the Genoese’s advertisement of his own expertise, meant to
persuade passengers to make the voyage against all odds. In the same manner, one
should understand the meaning behind Jacques de Vitry’s statement that the Genoese
were used to crossing the sea in winter owing to their very sturdy ships of great size.
His comment that “in that season the provisions aboard ship do not go bad easily nor
the water putrefy as [it does] aboard ships in summer” (Huygens, 1960: 77–78) also
strongly sounds like persuasion to risk such a voyage. In reality, according to the same
writers, people vomited or lay down and certainly did not care for food. One can
safely assume that Genoese captains were ready to take all risks to achieve profits,
clearly conscious of the limitations of the nautical capabilities of their ships. As sea-
men, such risks were part of their everyday life. One can also assume that the increase
in volume of maritime transportation and trade between Europe and the Crusader
Levant intensified the competition between Genoa, Pisa, and especially Venice, whose
sea routes naturally crossed the Ionian and Aegean Sea. Ibn Jubayr attests the Genoese
captains’ intimate knowledge of various sea routes on high seas before the introduc-
tion of portolans and the adoption of the compass used in conjunction with marine
charts in the late thirteenth century. Furthermore, relying on Casola’s eye-witness
description, we might question the effectiveness of the compass and charts as against
the practical experience of pilots (Newett, 1907: 299, 302). It is, however, worth
underscoring the exceptional daring of the Genoese, also pioneers in crossing the
Straits of Gibraltar in the 1270s and in adopting new types of ship.
The next phase in innovative shipbuilding technology took place in the fourteenth
century in merchant sailers, with the introduction of a new kind of ship into the
Mediterranean, the cocha, derived from the northern European and Atlantic cog
with its capacious hull form and flat bottom. Unlike northern cogs, however, these

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