ethno-religious minorities 373
a locus for a particularly intense and varied dynamic of exchange and innovation, all
the more because it was the centre point of trade and communication between these
regions until Atlantic trade routes were opened and sail power was superseded by
steam and rail. And finally, the historical circumstances of the period, in which the
Mediterranean was an arena of conflict for a multiplicity of Christian and Muslim
principalities, republics, clans and collectives, none of which had the power to domi-
nate the region, meant that if rulers intended to fully impose their authority on their
out-group subjects, they risked undermining the prosperity and viability of their own
territories.
The “principle of convenience” and minority–majority relationsBy the turn of the first millennium, successive phases of region-wide (or nearly region-
wide) hegemonic domination, under the Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, and finally,
Muslims, engendered a loose region-wide cultural homogeneity at the top. This grew
out of a common religious orientation (scriptural Abrahamic monotheism), a com-
mon cultural orientation (Roman, Helleno–Persian, Hebrew), and the currency of
meta-ecumenian languages (Arabic, Latin and Greek) among elite groups across the
region. Meanwhile, the character of Mediterranean geography, and its implications
regarding trade and exchange, engendered a sort of loose hegemony emanating from
the bottom, rooted in the currency of common vernaculars, shared social values
(regarding gender, slavery, warfare, virtue, and so on), and overlapping folk traditions
(as with medicine, magic, and spirituality). The result of all of this was a “mutual intel-
ligibility” that enabled an intense dynamic of exchange, acculturation and innovation
of technologies, ideas and beliefs. Moreover, it provided a medium for communica-
tion and collaboration between corporate entities of different religio-cultural orienta-
tions, and facilitated the emergence of hegemonic entities that bridged religio-cultural
divides. These polities and their elites could engage effectively with the minorities
under their rule because they were thus relieved of the need to impose “legibility”
(Barkey, 2008) on their out-group subjects, and could interact with them by means
of institutional structures that each regarded as legitimate.
Predatory warrior elites—who could not rule autocratically or impose their will
arbitrarily due to the complexity of the region, their own vulnerabilities, and the
limitations of their own power—had to negotiate the terms of submission of the
peoples they conquered, including out-group ethno-religious communities. Their
authority came to rest on a mutually-conceded legitimacy, conceived of within a
hierarchical framework predicated on religious identity. Once such relationships had
been established as consequences of the exigencies of conquest and submission, the
presence of minority communities came to be recognized as established in principle,
although rights and limitations were periodically renegotiated, either formally or
informally, when either the majority or minority felt the confidence to push for
advantage. This can be seen, for example, in the Crown of Aragon in the
fourteenth century, where even mudéjar aljamas (communities) that had been
engaged in open rebellion were able to obtain concessions from a vulnerable
monarchy, and in contrast to thirteenth-century Italy, where the vestigial Muslim
community was arbitrarily transported to the mainland. In twelfth- and thirteenth-
century Egypt, dhimmis obtained privileges and position far greater than that