374 brian a. catlos
permitted under the “Pact of Umar,” whereas in the contemporary Maghreb they
were subjected at times to forced conversion, in spite of it.
In the final analysis the autonomy and stability of minority communities was a
function of their ability to dominate economic and political niches that were crucial
to the interests of the dominant society or its rulers, and which did not put them in
competition with elements of the majority. Diversity was sustained, in effect, by an
equilibrium of political and economic interdependence lubricated by socio-cultural
affinities. Across the Christian and Islamic Mediterranean some minority communi-
ties provided agricultural labor, others were crucial to commerce, and many domi-
nated key craft industries or trades. At times domestic administration or the military
was controlled by minority elites, and they were often prominent in diplomacy, and in
educated professions (notably medicine). Generally speaking, the more niches a
minority community occupied, and the broader the range of relations of interdepend-
ence it had with the majority, the more stable and secure it would be. Whether as a
result of cost-benefit analysis or stimulus response, elements within the majority, and
especially elites, were not likely to undertake repressive policies if they themselves
would suffer negative consequences as a result of the repression of a minority
community.
This is not to deny that cultural currents and religious ideology were factors in
shaping ethno-religious relations. The stability of these societies depended to a great
degree on maintaining at least the appearances of a hierarchical relationship between
clearly-defined religious communities, in which the majority group enjoyed broader
privileges and a higher status. This was rarely, however, reflected by political and social
realities, and almost inevitably the wealthiest and most powerful (and most visible)
members of religious minorities had a greater status than the poor majority of the
dominant group. Thus, an element of instability was built into these relationships,
with the inherently chauvinistic discourse of religious doctrine providing a rationale
and language for sectarian oppression and even violence, when members of the major-
ity group felt threatened by, or indifferent to, the fate of minority communities, or
were in the grips of general social or religious anxiety. Fear of contamination, both
sexual and religious, was a concern for both majority and minority communities, and
served as a rationalization for social segregation, although this was often driven also
by fiscal motives (maintaining the distinct tax regimes each were subject to). The
choreography of public ceremonies, and the public humiliation of minorities through
requirements to dress distinctively, helped to reinforce the perception of this order,
together with ritualized or occasional, spontaneous acts of violence that served to
defuse tensions and address the frustrations of underclasses within the dominant
community.
On the other hand, there was considerable syncretism and acculturation, on the
level both of folk traditions and formal theology. Communal lines often blurred, not
only socially and economically, but also on the level of religion. This was encouraged
both tacitly and actively by “corporate”-level actors (that is, rulers and institutions)
whose interests lay in cultivating minority communities, and who staked their author-
ity on their capacity to safeguard these “protected peoples.” Rulers presented them-
selves as legitimate sovereigns of their out-group subjects and sponsored (and often
participated in) their public religious ceremonies. Mediterranean society was, in effect,
a complex system in which actors at the micro-, meso-, and macro-levels adopted