the mediterranean and asia 453
quickly by inventing institutions that maximized their capacity to mobilize resources,
by mastering new military techniques and technologies, and by accommodating the
interests of subject groups to maintain domestic stability (Barkey, 2008: 69). They
drew eclectically from a number of state traditions (Byzantine, Central Asian, Islamic)
to develop a state order that consolidated power in the hands of a central authority, at
the very time when their rivals were dealing with the growth of centrifugal power.
With such novel institutions as the Janissary corps and the timar system, which
entailed land grants for military service on limited tenure, Ottoman rulers effectively
eliminated aristocratic power and were able to levy vast numbers of well-trained and
loyal troops, whereas Christian kings had to entertain the interests of powerful feuda-
tories when mobilizing their own military forces. It was this Ottoman ability to levy
large and predictable numbers, claims Colin Imber, “that underpinned Ottoman suc-
cess” (2002: 257).
When they finally captured Constantinople in 1453, the Ottomans had created a
highly sophisticated military machine that went on to conquer half the Mediterranean
world, along with vast parts of Asia, Africa and Europe. Between the fifteenth and late
seventeenth centuries, western Eurasia would again be dominated by a Mediterranean
power, and Constantinople would again be its greatest city. By that stage, the Turks
had been a feature of the Mediterranean for hundreds of years: they too had become
a Mediterranean people. And their imprint on the Mediterranean was profound. Their
minarets and madrasas could be seen along the Adriatic, throughout the Aegean, the
Black Sea, and their authority extended as far as the Maghreb.
Ottoman power and influence was linked to controls over trade from Asian mar-
kets, which remained lucrative long after the Portuguese found direct access to the
Indian Ocean. The Ottoman state regarded the spice and silk trades as vital interests,
so much so that the conquest of Egypt in 1517 and the Hejaz were motivated
primarily by the need to challenge Portuguese domination of the pepper trade. In the
sixteenth century the Ottomans were genuine participants in the oceanic age of explo-
ration, with their influence extending as far as the Indonesian archipelago (Casale,
2010). For such reasons, the transoceanic routes charted by the Atlantic seaborne
powers did not spell an immediate end to Mediterranean prosperity. As Braudel noted,
the effects of decline were noticeable only towards the end of the seventeenth century,
almost 200 years after the opening of these routes (Braudel, 1972–3 1240; see also
Greene, this volume).
With regard to the Ottomans, decline became readily apparent over the course of
the eighteenth century. Within a few decades of the second siege of Vienna (1683),
the balance of military power had shifted in favor of the Europeans, and by the end
of the disastrous Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774, the empire’s relative interna-
tional standing had been profoundly diminished. Until its final dismemberment
after World War One, it depended for its survival on the good will of European
powers such as Britain and Germany. Indeed the Mediterranean and Asia, along
with the rest of the world, were all subject to a new center of gravity that had the
entire globe in its thrall. In world history terms, however, the peripheralization of
the Mediterranean and Asia is a recent development. For most of the history of
social complexity, a different axis of power, wealth and culture obtained. The history
of the Mediterranean can be read as an extension of this larger historical axis that
was essentially based in Asia.