LATE ROMAN SOCIETY AND ECONOMYselection of offi cials. In 439 an oath was exacted from all those appointed to
provincial governorships that they had not paid to secure offi ce:
we ordain that men appointed to provincial governorships should not
be promoted by bribe or payment but by their own proven worth and
your [i.e., the prefect’s] recommendation; let them testify on oath that in
gaining their responsibilities they have neither made any payment nor will
they make any subsequently.
(CJ IX.27.6 pr.)Yet later emperors actually sold offi ces: Zeno, for instance, raised the price
for the governorship of Egypt from 50 lb of gold to nearly 500 (Malchus, fr.
16, Blockley). Justinian again tried to stop the practice, repeating the earlier
demand for an oath from those appointed. Novel 8 (535) forbade the practice
of suffragium, i.e. the buying of offi ce, for provincial governors (though there
were fi xed costs that governors were expected to take on), and the secular of-
fi cials were required to take an oath that was strongly Christian and orthodox
in character.^41 Bishops and clergy also commonly made payments for offi ce;
again, Justinian legislated against this, but later took the alternative course
of regulating such payments.^42 The whole constituted a fi nely balanced eco-
system with both economic and political implications for the emperors, and
they were reluctant as well as unable to upset it too drastically. As in most
complex societies, they also had to balance the tension between two needs:
to manage the expectations of the elite and to keep the machinery of govern-
ment working. Justinian promoted a ‘reform’ agenda in his self-presentation,
but whether effi ciency was even a possible aim in practice, as distinct from
offi cial and legal pronouncements, is a fundamental question. ‘Effi ciency’ is a
modernizing concept, and it is unclear that the system of payment made the
administration any less effi cient than it would otherwise have been. Procopius
claims that Justinian himself was selling offi ces again within a year of his edict
of 535, and his successor, Justin II (565–78) legislated again in 569 to stop
governors from buying their offi ce.^43 The corollary, and the underpinning of
the sale of offi ces, was, of course, the desire of the offi ce-holders themselves
to recoup the moneys paid while they held offi ce, the prospect of which had
been a powerful attraction to purchase in the fi rst place. Regulation was there-
fore probably the best option for the government, and we can also see the
close connection between their attempts at regulation and the changing proc-
esses by which offi cials, especially provincial governors, were appointed.
One of the main hallmarks of the late Roman administrative system was pa-
tronage and the use of infl uence. Recent work has increasingly emphasized the
importance of patronage in understanding ancient society as a whole, especially
in the context of the Roman empire, and the patronage system of the later Ro-
man empire could involve not just networks of obligation, but also coercion and
even violence.^44 Patronage has existed and does exist in many – perhaps even
all – societies, but is present typically where the protection offered by the state