afghanistanto the ‘less enlightened’ states of Central Asia. Some 170 years later, President
George W. Bush would revisit this argument, claiming that regime change
followed by the implementation of free-market economics would lead to
the establishment of democracy, freedom and good governance, rather
than tyranny and chaos.
Ellenborough’s vision, however, went much further. He wanted direct
political involvement in the Indus States by employing government subsi-
dies and other incentives to secure the loyalty of these rulers. Britain should
also take a proactive approach to acquiring accurate military, political and
geographic intelligence of regions that were still terra incognita. In the
event Britain deemed that Russia threatened Khiva or Herat militarily,
Britain, as a last resort, should unilaterally occupy Lahore, Kabul, Kandahar
and Herat. Any ruler who refused to accede to British demands should
be threatened with annexation or replaced by a more pliant head of state.
The problem with Ellenborough’s policy was that it bore little reality
to the situation on the ground and implicitly committed Britain to mili-
tary intervention if its interests were threatened by rulers who did not
toe the line, even if they were treaty allies. The occupation of Lahore, for
example, would not only end the Anglo-Sikh alliance, which had been the
mainstay of India’s northwestern frontier policy since 1809, but would risk
the Sikhs turning to Russia for military assistance, thus creating the very
scenario Ellenborough sought to prevent. The same applied to all the other
Indus States. Ellenborough’s policy of ‘either you are with us or with the
Tsarists’ was therefore a prescription for destabilization and conflict, not
peace and security.
As for his vision of commercial penetration of Central Asia,
Ellenborough failed to take into account the complex logistical and polit-
ical problems of this trans-Asian trade. As early as 1809 Elphinstone noted
that Russian goods dominated the bazaars of the Central Asian Khanates
and that they were both cheap and easily transportable. St Petersburg and
Bukhara had also long been on friendly terms and had regular ambassa-
dorial contact. In 1831 Alexander Burnes, during his mission to Bukhara,
noted that while there might be a demand for British woollen goods, the
Uzbek Khanates beyond the Hindu Kush had very little to offer in the way
of return trade. One of their main sources of income was slaves, a form of
commerce British officials regarded as ‘barbaric’.
In 1830 Britain had no port on the Indus, for Karachi was not then in
British hands and, anyway, was just a small fishing village. All British goods
bound for Central Asia therefore had to be shipped to Calcutta, unloaded,
then barged up the Ganges. When they reached the river-head they had