nadir shah and the afghans, 1732–47Parliamentarians, for example, did not have a copy of the Tripartite Treaty
until March 1839, while the papers related to the missions of Burnes and
McNeill only began to be released in early April. This made it difficult for
the Tories to determine whether, as Ellenborough put it, the Governor
General’s actions were just folly or a crime. Other voices raised in concern
about the possibility of war in Afghanistan included the Duke of Wellington
who, with a foresight Auckland lacked, stated that ‘our difficulties would
commence where our military successes ended’. 63 Mountstuart Elphinstone
also noted that while it might be easy to occupy Kandahar and Kabul, it
would be ‘hopeless’ to attempt to maintain Shah Shuja‘ on the throne. 64
When the government finally published the Parliamentary Papers they
were heavily edited, several key documents were omitted altogether and
Burnes and McNeill’s dispatches had been heavily redacted. The published
paper, though, did not indicate where there was a lacuna and read as if
nothing had been removed. This gave a highly misleading view of the
events leading up to the Simla Declaration and made it impossible for
parliamentarians outside of the inner cabinet to assess the situation object
ively. When unexpurgated copies of Burnes’s correspondence were leaked
to the Bombay Times there was uproar, with the Tories demanding the
government publish the documents in full. Palmerston, though, hid behind
the usual government excuse that it was ‘not in the public interest’ and
appealed to Honourable and Right Honourable members not to impugn
the integrity of Her Majesty’s Government but to trust its judgement in
such sensitive issues. Palmerston’s stonewalling won the day; the Tory
motions of censure were never debated and there was not even a vote in
the House on whether to go to war or not.
Amir Dost Muhammad Khan’s invasion of BalkhMeanwhile in Kabul, Dost Muhammad Khan appears not to have fully
grasped the implications of the withdrawal of the Burnes Mission. He
was unsure if Britain would go to war and, even if Britain did, he believed
hostilities would not commence until the spring of 1839 at the earliest.
The Amir therefore decided to extend his authority north of the Hindu
Kush and sent an army commanded by his designated heir, Akram Khan,
to force Khulm and Qataghan to accept his authority. His hope was that
if he succeeded, state revenues would increase, for he would control all
the customs points between the Amu Darya and Kabul, as well as receive
substantial additional income from tribute. The subjugation of these Uzbek
states also provided the Amir with a possible safe haven in the event of an