nadir shah and the afghans, 1732–47only ten days’ supplies left and local rulers unable, or unwilling, to supply
grain and fodder due to a poor harvest the previous year, the troops were
put on half rations while the camp followers, who were left to fend for
themselves, were reduced to eating fried sheepskins, clots of animal blood
and roots. As morale plummeted, tempers frayed and Cotton, Keane and
their subordinate officers quarrelled over policy and logistics. Privately
Macnaghten admitted that the army was on the verge of mutiny, yet he
showed little sympathy for its predicament. His resentment against the
military command increased when Cotton informed him that army
intelligence had reported that Shah Shuja‘ was extremely unpopular in
Afghanistan. Cotton, Macnaghten noted, was a ‘sad croaker’, his favourite
term of abuse for any individual who did not share his naive optimism
about Shah Shuja‘ in particular and the invasion in general. 68
Keane eventually caught up with the advanced guard in Quetta after an
even more harrowing journey, for the desert was strewn with the skeletons
of pack animals and during the crossing of the Bolan Pass his troops had
to climb over the rotten, halfea ten bodies of sepoys and camp followers.
There was some good news at least. Burnes had managed to persuade
Mehrab Khan, beglar begi of Kalat, to provide safe passage for the army
and supplies, though only after the payment of a very substantial fee. At
the same time, Mehrab Khan made it clear to Burnes that in his view the
whole expedition was doomed to failure.
Macnaghten, though, could not bring himself to believe that Mehrab
Khan was trustworthy and even while Burnes was negotiating the treaty,
Macnaghten wrote to Auckland accusing him of being an ‘implacable
enemy’ and urged the Governor General to authorize the annexation
of all the towns along the army’s supply route. Auckland refused but
Macnaghten eventually got his way. In early November 1839 Macnaghten
again accused Mehrab Khan of duplicity and cutting the army’s supply
line, so the Bombay Division, on its way back to India, was sent to attack
Kalat. When it fell the city was sacked, Mehrab Khan and many of Kalat’s
principal leaders were slain and the region incorporated as part of Shah
Shuja‘ alMulk’s kingdom. A few months later Masson recorded the devas
tation wrought by the army in Kalat as well as the destruction left in the
wake of the army’s advance through Sind.
The army’s next challenge was the Khojak Pass, an even more formid
able barrier than the Bolan Pass. Once again the troops had to fight their
way up the narrow defile, which local Ghilzai and Baluch tribesmen had
blocked with stones. On the Kandahar side of the pass Kohan Dil Khan
and a force of 1,500 tribal levies were poised to attack as the army entered