afghanistan
The Amir’s ‘surrender’ has given rise to much speculation by histor-
ians and, given the outcome of the Battle of Parwan Darra, his decision
was peculiar, to say the least. Imperial historians, and even more recent
ones, tend to refer to Dost Muhammad Khan’s act as a surrender and
offer a number of explanations that vary from the inane to the ridiculous.
According to some, Dost Muhammad Khan’s action was a recognition of
Britain’s Manifest Destiny to control, if not to rule, all the country between
the Indus and the Amu Darya. Others claim that, having saved face after his
defeat at Saighan, Dost Muhammad Khan was now free to surrender with-
out loss of honour. Another absurd theory is that Dost Muhammad Khan
surrendered because he had witnessed the suicidal bravery of Captain
Fraser and Dr Lord, an action that convinced him that ‘resistance was
useless’. This, of course, ignores the fact that the Bengal Horse had refused
to follow their officers into battle and then turned and fled or the fact that
large numbers of Shah Shuja‘ al-Mulk’s troops had deserted. An even less
credible explanation is that the Amir was concerned about the fate of his
wives and children, who were in British custody and about to be exiled to
India. Yet Dost Muhammad was in no position to do anything to prevent
their exile and Macnaghten had already assured them that they would be
treated honourably. In fact, Dost Muhammad Khan was far more upset
at Nawab Jabbar Khan’s decision to accept the British offer than he was
about the fate of his wives and children. He even accused his half-brother
of treachery, implying that Jabbar Khan had handed over his family in
exchange for a pledge that he would not be executed, imprisoned or exiled.
What is clear is that Dost Muhammad Khan was not surrendering
in the manner of a defeated enemy. He had got the better of the Battle of
Parwan Darra and, despite the loss at Saighan, the British had been forced
to abandon Bamiyan and draw their forward defensive line at Charikar.
The revolt in Kohistan had swung the military balance in Dost Muhammad
Khan’s favour, yet for some reason he decided to give up the struggle.
Mohan Lal, who accompanied Sale’s Brigade, provides the most coher-
ent explanation for Dost Muhammad’s action. According to Lal, certain
unnamed Kohistani amirs planned to assassinate Dost Muhammad Khan
and had paid a sniper to shoot him during the battle so that his death
could be blamed on the British. Lal’s account is supported by letters to
the Amir from Sultan Muhammad Khan of Nijrab, which were found in
Dost Muhammad Khan’s baggage after the battle and in which the Amir
is warned to take great care if he went to Tagab, for some of the maliks
planned to betray or assassinate him. ‘Abd al-Karim ‘Alawi, who wrote a
near-contemporary account of the First Afghan War, elaborated on the
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