nadir shah and the afghans, 1732–47details of this plot. 10 According to him, Sale and Burnes were in secret
communication with the malik of ‘Ali Hisar, who agreed to kill or capture
Dost Muhammad Khan and his two sons in return for the payment of a
substantial sum of rupees.
Atkinson provides an even more intriguing slant on these events, based
on confidential information provided by senior British officers. According
to these sources, Macnaghten and Burnes had been intercepting commu-
nications between Sultan Muhammad Khan of Nijrab and his supporters
in Kabul. In response Macnaghten forged a letter from a well-wisher to
Dost Muhammad Khan, warning him that there was a plan to assassinate
him during the battle. Dost Muhammad Khan, having read this commu-
nication, was convinced there was a plot against his life. The Amir, after all,
had good reason to distrust the leaders of Kohistan, for twice in the past he
had conducted bloody suppressions in the area and killed or executed the
fathers and relatives of many of the leaders of the mujahidin. This explains
why Dost Muhammad Khan rode away during the heat of battle without
telling his sons he was leaving or where he was going. The only person he
seems to have fully trusted was Sultan Muhammad Khan of Nijrab.
Dost Muhammad’s options were limited. The Mir Wali and Murad Beg
had signed a treaty with Shah Shuja‘ and would no longer provide him with
sanctuary, while his experience in Bukhara convinced him that he risked
death or imprisonment if he attempted to seek refuge in Balkh. His nearest
point of safety, therefore, was the British cantonment in Kabul, a couple of
hours’ ride from Parwan Darra. The Amir had already received repeated
assurances from Lord and Macnaghten that he would be treated honour-
ably, and Dost Muhammad Khan guessed, rightly, that Macnaghten would
not hand him over to Shah Shuja‘ for execution, although Macnaghten had
originally argued that the Amir ‘be shown no mercy’. 11 It is ironic that Dost
Muhammad Khan reckoned that his best chance of staying alive and living
to fight another day was as a prisoner of his enemy, the British, rather than
claiming the protection of his own subjects.
Dost Muhammad’s submission was nothing akin to surrender, since
he had not been defeated at Parwan Darra and his army was in good
shape. Rather, by grasping the envoy’s stirrup, Dost Muhammad Khan was
employing a traditional form of submission employed by high -ranking
individuals. The right of rikab giriftan, or grasping the stirrup, was a
well-established Turco-Mongolian tradition accorded to only the most
senior and trusted individuals of the kingdom. To hold the king’s stirrup
was not just recognition of the rider’s sovereignty and lordship, it was also
a demonstration of the exalted rank of the one who grasped it. Atkinson