afghanistanDost Muhammad Khan’s return to Afghanistan and consolidation
of his authorityEven so, Dost Muhammad Khan’s time in India would have had little impact
on Afghanistan’s future political development if Lord Ellenborough had not
decided to allow the Amir and all other exiles to return to their country
without any preconditions. This was a risky strategy given that the Amir’s
son, Akbar Khan, had been instrumental in Macnaghten’s assassination
and the massacre of British and Indian troops. After all, Dost Muhammad
Khan could have decided to make the most of Britain’s unpopu larity to
renew his claim on Peshawar or invade the Punjab, especially now that
in the wake of Ranjit Singh’s death his kingdom had been torn apart by
civil war.
Dost Muhammad Khan, however, had too much on his plate intern-
ally to risk another war with the Sikhs and anyway, two years after his
return to Kabul, the British lost patience with the chaotic situation in the
Punjab and sent in the army. Following a series of heavy defeats in March
1846, Maharaja Duleep Singh signed a treaty that included the payment
of a heavy war indemnity and ceded Jullundar Duaba to the British. Dost
Muhammad Khan must have watched the destruction of Sikh power with a
great deal of satisfaction for it now no longer posed a threat to his kingdom
and indirectly Britain had strengthened his own hand. Free from the threat
of invasion the Amir was now able to pursue his own expansionist plans.
Dost Muhammad Khan’s first priority on returning to Afghanistan
was to assert his authority over a country devastated by war. Kabul was in
ruins, the result of both internecine fighting and the destruction caused
by the Army of Retribution. As for the rich agricultural regions of Koh
Daman and Tagab, they had been devastated by Sale’s scorched-earth
policy. Trade, too, was at a standstill and most of the Hindu baniyas had
fled to India, taking their wealth with them. The country was suffering from
major shortages of food and fodder since most of the country’s reserves
had been consumed by the Army of the Indus, while the mortality rate
among Afghans as a consequence of the war, both directly and indirectly,
was far higher than anything the British had suffered. The use of grapeshot
left many thousands more maimed for life and unable to support their
families. To add to the misery, thousands of civilians had been internally
displaced and many had lost everything they possessed. Such material
losses had a severe impact on agricultural output as well as state revenues.
Perhaps even more destructive was the socio-political impact of the
invasion. The mainly Pushtun south turned back in on itself and the power