nadir shah and the afghans, 1732–47bothered to include him in the diplomatic exchanges or ask his opinion
on the proposed frontier. Then in June 1873 Russian troops occupied Khiva
and the Khan ceded exclusive navigation rights along the Amu Darya to
Russia. He also surrendered sovereignty over any Khivan territory that
bordered on this river. As far as Forward Policy advocates were concerned,
the fall of Khiva proved Russia was not prepared to honour any de facto
frontier arrangement but planned to occupy Herat, which would become
the base for an invasion of northwestern India.
In May 1873, with Russian forces poised to take Khiva, Sher ‘Ali Khan,
alarmed at the possible Russian threat to Herat and Afghan Turkistan,
imposed compulsory conscription to increase the size of his army and
began to construct a series of new fortifications in the Chahar Wilayat. Sher
‘Ali then wrote to Lord Northbrook, who had succeeded Mayo as Viceroy,
requesting guns, ammunition and money to defend his northern frontier.
Yet despite the strident demands for active intervention made by Disraeli’s
Conservative Opposition, Northbrook rejected the Amir’s request, for the
Viceroy was not convinced the fall of Khiva posed an imminent threat to
India. As long as the Tsar’s forces ‘did not touch Persia or Afghanistan’, he
believed there was no need to panic, for Russia risked overextending itself.
‘The more Russia extends her possessions in these parts,’ Northbrooke
noted, ‘the more open she is to injury from us, while she has no more
power to injure us than she did before.’ 23
In 1869 it had been Lord Mayo who was most concerned about the
Russian threat to Afghanistan but now it was Sher ‘Ali Khan who was fear-
ful. Only four years before the amirs of the Chahar Wilayat had welcomed
Ishaq Khan with open arms, while Herat under his rebellious son, Ya‘qub
Khan, was ripe for Russian interference. Northbrook’s solution was to send
a mission to Kabul to discuss the crisis, but the Amir declined the request
and offered instead to send his prime minister, Sayyid Nur Muhammad
Shah, to India. Northbrook accepted and in July 1873 the two sides met in
Simla, but it was evident from the outset that Anglo-Afghan relations had
deteriorated markedly since their last meeting.
Nur Muhammad Shah informed the British delegation that the Amir
was angry about the Viceroy’s failure to consult him over the Anglo-Russian
frontier agreement and wanted a clear statement of Britain’s intentions in
the event of a Russian attack on Afghan territory. Nur Muhammad then
pointed out that, since Britain expected the Amir to defend India’s frontiers,
it was only proper that Britain should contribute to the cost of the military
build-up and argued that, according to the Afghan interpretation of Mayo’s
aide-memoire, Britain had committed itself to provide military and financial