afghanistanassistance in such circumstances. Northbrook, however, rejected this inter-
pretation and pointed out any assistance was solely at the discretion of the
Viceroy. At the same time, Northbrook assured Nur Muhammad Shah that
Britain remained committed to the territorial integrity of Afghanistan, but
in the event of an unprovoked attack military aid would only be forthcoming
after every diplomatic channel had been exhausted.
Another serious stumbling block was Afghanistan’s dispute with
Persia over the Sistan. In 1869 the Amir had asked Lord Mayo to mediate
in this affair but he had declined, yet just two years later Major General
Frederick Goldsmid was sent to demarcate this frontier. The Amir agreed
to this arrangement only because he was convinced Afghanistan’s claim
to the whole of the Sistan was so strong that Goldsmid would find in
Afghanistan’s favour. The Shah of Persia, on the other hand, was so
angry about the demarcation that the Iranian government withdrew all
its cooperation. So in an attempt to pacify the Shah, Goldsmid adopted
the solution of Solomon and divided Sistan between the two countries,
which pleased neither the Amir nor Persia. To make matters worse, the
first intim ation the Afghan government had of the Goldsmid frontier was
when Nur Muhammad Shah arrived in Simla. When Sher ‘Ali Khan heard
of the proposed new border he greeted the news with ‘deep mortification’
and there was a prolonged and heated debate over the matter between
the Afghan and British negotiators. Nur Muhammad Shah eventually
agreed to the Goldsmid demarcation under duress, in expectation that
the British would compensate the Amir for this substantial loss of terri-
tory and rev enue by agreeing a more favourable treaty. However, Lord
Northbrook had no authority to conclude a formal arrangement, despite
the threat posed by the occupation of Khiva.
While not able to meet the Amir’s expectations, Northbrook wanted
Sher ‘Ali Khan to make what for him were major concessions and permit the
stationing of a permanent British Resident in his country. Nur Muhammad
Shah again declined the request, for ‘the Afghans were deplorably ignor-
ant and entertained the idea that a deputation of British Agents is always
a precursor to annexation’. He also pointed out that ‘there was a strong
party in Cabul opposed to the Ameer entering into intimate relations with
the British government’. 24 Northbrook eventually concluded, on the basis
of Mayo’s aide-memoire, that he could not insist on a British officer in
Afghanistan without the Amir’s consent, but suggested that British officers
should demarcate the country’s northern frontier and advise him on the
defences in Balkh. Given the heavy-handed way the British had handled
the Sistan frontier dispute, however, the Amir rejected this suggestion too.