afghanistan
If, on the other hand, the Ameer showed obvious signs of dis -
inclination to improve his relations with us, I would take it as clear
proof that hostile influence had worked more effectually than we
now suppose, that it was useless to attempt to coax or cajole him
into a better frame of mind, and we must look for alliances and
influences elsewhere than at Cabul, [we] must seek them in Kalat,
at Candahar, Herat, and in Persia, and I would lose no time in
looking out for them. 32The Amir must realize, Frere went on, that he was ‘a weak power
between two enormously strong ones, an earthen vessel between two iron
o n e s ’. 33 During their Cairo meeting, Frere showed Lytton copies of his
letters and recommendations to Salisbury. Lytton noted: ‘There is some-
thing positively startling in the almost exact coincidence of Sir Bartle
Frere’s opinions with those which, before leaving England, I put on paper
confidentially for examination by Lord Salisbury and Mr Disraeli who
entirely concurred with them.’ 34 In fact there was nothing remarkable about
this ‘coincidence’, for Salisbury’s official instructions to Lytton included
most of Frere’s recommendations.
Salisbury, in a serious breach of protocol, had not bothered to telegraph
a copy of Lytton’s instructions to Calcutta and left him to deliver them in
person. When the Viceroy’s Council heard that Lytton was instructed to
force the issue of a permanent resident in Afghanistan as the litmus test
of the Amir’s loyalty, there was a storm of protest and relations between
Lytton, his Council and other senior officials deteriorated. One member
of the Viceroy’s Council later denounced him as ‘the very worst Viceroy
that ever went to India’, while other officials concluded it was impossible
to work under Lytton and applied for extended home leave. Despite being
‘shockingly ignorant’ of the situation in Afghanistan, 35 Lytton overruled
all objections and in the end did not bother to consult his Council in such
matters. Some officials concluded that the Viceroy had secret instructions
from London to pick a fight with Sher ‘Ali Khan so that Britain could
have an excuse to annex or dismember Afghanistan. Lytton’s opinion of
Sher ‘Ali Khan did not help the situation either: in private correspondence
he called the Amir, among other things, ‘a semi-barbarous sovereign’, ‘a
weak, barbarian chief ’ and ‘not only a savage, but a savage with a touch
of insanity’. 36