nadir shah and the afghans, 1732–47The Pelly Mission and the Peshawar ConferenceOne of Lytton’s first acts as Viceroy was to order Sir Lewis Pelly, an experi-
enced diplomat who had served in the embassy in Tehran, to travel to
Kabul in order ‘to ascertain the true attitude of the Amir towards the
Government of India’. Lytton, though, did not bother to consult the Amir’s
wishes on the matter and the first intimation Sher ‘Ali Khan had of the Pelly
Mission came in Lytton’s first official letter to him. Lytton disingenuously
claimed Pelly’s visit was to explain the Disraeli government’s decision to
declare Queen Victoria as Empress of India and to discuss ‘matters of
common interest between the two governments’. He then held out the
prospect of a treaty that would include an annual subsidy, ‘more decided
recognition’ of ‘Abd Allah Jan as heir apparent, and ‘an explicit pledge... of
material support in case of foreign aggression’. However, while raising the
Amir’s hopes, Lytton deliberately omitted to inform the Amir what Britain’s
preconditions were for such a treaty. Furthermore, as Frere and Salisbury
had recommended, Pelly’s mission was more a test of the Amir’s loyalty
than it was about anything else. As Lytton noted, ‘in the event of the Amir
refusing to receive such a mission the Government of India might find
themselves obliged to reconsider their whole policy towards Afghanistan,
but there would be no doubt about the Ameer’s estrangement.’ 37
The Amir was deeply troubled at the news of the Pelly Mission, for he
was well aware how unpopular such a visit would be, particularly with the
anti-British party at court. In his reply, the Amir suggested he send Nur
Muhammad Shah to Peshawar to meet Pelly and reiterated the warning
that he could not guarantee Pelly’s safety if he came to Kabul. The Amir
also pointed out that if Pelly came to the Afghan capital, General Kaufman
might well demand the right to send a Russian envoy too. Sher ‘Ali Khan
then admitted he was far from optimistic about the outcome of a third
round of negotiations, noting that the two previous meetings had failed to
produce the outcome he had expected and had only led to further strains
in Anglo-Afghan relations. A third conference, he warned, might make
matters worse.
Lytton regarded the Amir’s reply as further proof of his untrustworthi-
ness and that he was trying to play Britain off against Russia. In a dispatch
to Salisbury, Lytton claimed that the Amir’s rejection of the Pelly Mission
was an insult to ‘the government of a great empire’. Britain, he declared,
‘suffers itself to be with impunity addressed by a weak and barbarian chief
who is under accumulated obligations to its protection and forbearance in
terms of contemptuous disregard’. 38 Lytton therefore initially rejected the