afghanistanthe internal affairs of the Afridis. In return Amir Ya‘qub Khan received a
meagre annual subsidy of six lakhs rupees and a pledge that British forces
would eventually withdraw from all Afghan territory, with the exception
of Kandahar.
Ya‘qub Khan was in no position to argue and on 26 May 1879 he put
his seal on the Treaty of Gandamak. Lytton was exultant and declared
the treaty marked ‘the commencement... of a new and better era for
Afghanistan’. Such was his level of self-deception that Lytton even claimed
the Afghans would ‘like and respect us all the more for the thrashing
we have given Sher ‘Ali and the lesson we have taught Russia’, and that
they bore Britain no ill will for invading their country. Salisbury profusely
congratulated the Viceroy on his ‘great success... and the brilliant qual-
ities you have displayed’, while Disraeli told Lytton that it was ‘greatly
owing to your energy and foresight [that] we have secured a scientific and
adequate frontier for our Indian Empire’. 2 Yet even before Disraeli’s letter
of congratulation reached India, this experiment in imperial bullying had
blown up in Lytton’s face.
Cavagnari was appointed as the British envoy in Kabul with the rank
of major and a knighthood thrown in for good measure. He arrived in
Kabul in late July 1879 where the mission was welcomed by a rendition of
‘God Save the Queen’ from the Amir’s brass band. His escort consisted of
75 Frontier Guides, Pathans and Sikhs, commanded by Lieutenant Walter
Hamilton, a great-nephew of General Sir George Pollock. Three months
earlier Hamilton had earned the Victoria Cross for his bravery at the Battle
of Fatehabad in Nangahar, but he never lived long enough to hear he
had won Britain’s highest military honour. The mission’s accommodation
was a crumbling sarai in the lower Bala Hisar. The building was never
intended as a defensive position, but it was the only unoccupied place in
the citadel capable of housing more than a hundred persons. According
to Major General Sir Charles MacGregor, who surveyed the site later, the
place was a ‘rat trap’.3 Cavagnari knew the sarai was indefensible, but he
did not demand more appropriate quarters for he had no wish to offend
Amir Ya’qub Khan.
Since most Afghan officials regarded the Treaty of Gandamak and the
imposition of Cavagnari’s mission as a national humiliation, they refused
to pay the customary courtesy call on the envoy. As far as they were
concerned, Amir Ya‘qub Khan was king in name only and even Cavagnari
noted that ‘the people of Afghanistan are inclined to look to the British
Envoy more than to their own ruler’. When the Amir sent his tax collectors
into the Koh Daman, the population refused to pay until his officials had