nadir shah and the afghans, 1732–47written authorization from the British envoy. As for the Afghan conscripts,
they pestered the Guides asking them when Cavagnari was going to abolish
the hated conscription system and allow them to return home. 4
Cavagnari, who had less than two years’ experience on the Afghan
frontier, ignored these warning signs and informed the Viceroy the
Afghans had been cowed and that even ‘the religious element at Kabul
was wonderfully quiet; in none of the mosques has a single word disap-
proving of the English alliance been uttered’. At the same time he noted a
strong anti-Ya‘qubid faction in the capital, but failed to make the connec-
tion between this party and the British occupation. Cavagnari was soon
floundering in a sea of intrigue and confessed to Lytton that he was ‘quite
bewildered’ as to whether to trust the Amir or not and he had not the
‘slightest conception’ about what was going on behind his back. 5 His lack
of skill and experience made him easy prey for officials, who exploited the
British presence to enrich themselves and further their own ambitions.
One of the most powerful of these opportunists was Sardar Wali
Muhammad Khan, who had been governor of Kabul during Sher ‘Ali
Khan’s reign. His loyalties were uncertain, for he was suspected of being in
communication with ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan and Ishaq Khan in Samarkand
and had ambitions to become Amir himself. Despite his familial affili-
ation with the Afzalids, Sardar Wali Muhammad Khan had defected to the
British when they occupied Kurram and Cavagnari appointed him to his
advisory council, where he and his allies proceeded to destroy what little
faith the envoy had in Amir Ya‘qub Khan’s loyalty. 6
As Cavagnari struggled to cope with a posting for which he was
eminently unqualified, in August the two mutinous regiments from Herat
and a third one from Balkh arrived in Kabul, having been promised that
the new Amir would pay their arrears of wages. The Herat regiments were
in a particularly bad mood for they had been given only 3 rupees per
head for road expenses and by the time they arrived in the capital they
were starving and penniless. Their temper was not improved by the fact
that the Ramazan fast had begun during their march. Within a matter of
days of their arrival they clashed with the Guides, but Cavagnari ignored
sympathizers when they warned that trouble was brewing.
Ya‘qub Khan had no cash to pay these troops for the state treasury
was nearly empty and he had not received a single rupee of the British
subsidy. Lytton had told Cavagnari that if Ya‘qub Khan was in need of
‘prompt pecuniary assistance’ it ‘would not be grudged’, but Cavagnari
withheld payment, for he wanted Ya‘qub Khan to ‘recognise and admit
his helplessness before offering such aid’. 7 Specifically, Cavagnari wanted