nadir shah and the afghans, 1732–47now been brought about by the hand of fate.’ 9 Britain now had no choice
but to send troops to Kabul, despite Lytton recognizing that there was a risk
of repeating the events of 1841/2. Since the Viceroy blamed Amir Ya‘qub
for the death of Cavagnari, rather than his, and his government’s, aggres-
sive policies, it was no longer possible for Ya‘qub to remain as Amir and
th e search was on, in Lytton’s words, for a new ‘puppet ruler’. Lytton was
particularly harsh in his condemnation of Amir Ya‘qub, accusing him of
actively inciting the mutineers, covertly calling for a jihad and deliberately
standing back while the British officers and their escort were slaughtered.
The Viceroy’s accusations were based mostly on the account of Sardar Wali
Muhammad Khan, a version that was highly convenient as far as Lytton
and Disraeli were concerned, since it exonerated them from any blame
and put all of it on the Amir. For this reason, Wali Muhammad Khan’s
account of Cavagnari’s death became embedded within British imperial
history and continues to be repeated uncritically by both popular writers
and academics.
Afghan and other contemporary accounts give a very different picture
about the background to the attack on the Residency. Perhaps the most
telling is that given by Amir Ya‘qub Khan himself in a letter to the Viceroy
written a few days after the events, and which included a profound apol-
ogy for the deaths. Lytton, inevitably, dismissed the Amir’s account as
‘Interior of the British Residency, looking south’, Illustrated London News, 20 December- The sketch was drawn after the massacre of Cavagnari and his escort.