dreams melted into air, 1919–29burnt and pillaged the Waziri settlement of Biland Khel. Further south, in
Baluchistan, British troops pre-empted an attack by ‘Abd al-Quddus Khan’s
Kandahar Division by occupying the Afghan frontier post of Spin Baldak.
The Third Anglo-Afghan War lasted exactly one month, though
desultory fighting continued until the Armistice was signed in August.
Despite subsequent propaganda by the Afghan government, its army had
been soundly defeated on two fronts, while Spin Baldak was occupied by
British forces. The war had been brief, but it had also been bloody. British
casualties amounted to 1,751 dead or wounded. Several hundred more
soldiers and camp followers died from ‘the most extensive and sudden’
outbreak of cholera to have occurred in the Khyber, Peshawar and Kohat
Districts. 15 The body count of Afghans dead on the field of battle was 1,000,
but hundreds more later died from their wounds. In all the war cost the
Indian treasury around £16 million. 16
The Afghan invasion may have been thwarted, but Nadir Khan’s
campaign precipitated a major uprising of the Achakzais and Waziris in
Baluchistan, which Nadir Khan did all he could to encourage. The revolt
began with the mutiny of Ghilzai levies recruited from Afghanistan, which
forced the evacuation of forward outposts and even Fort Sandeman.
Although Fort Sandeman was retaken a few days later, hostilities con -
tinued until the summer of 1919 when an outbreak of cholera decimated
both British and Afghan forces.
The Rawalpindi Conference and Anglo-Afghan relationsOn 24 May 1919 Amir ’Aman Allah Khan, threatened with a British occu-
pation of Jalalabad and Kandahar, sued for peace and in early June he
accepted the Viceroy’s terms for an Armistice. The decision to agree to a
ceasefire was not welcomed by religious and tribal leaders who were eager
to continue the jihad, while Nadir Khan continued to covertly support
the revolt in Waziristan. ‘Abd al-Quddus Khan wished for the war to be
perpetuated too, for he had yet to fire a shot in anger. In order to justify
the Amir’s decision to order a ceasefire, government propaganda claimed
that Afghan victories had forced Britain to the negotiating table.
While the Amir dealt with the fallout of his failed jihad, British officials
disagreed over how best to handle the Afghan crisis. 17 Curzon, backed by
Sir Denys Bray, India’s Deputy Foreign Secretary, wanted to revert to the
closed frontier policy of the era of ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan and maintain
strict control over Afghanistan’s foreign relations. Curzon also wanted the
Amir to hand over the Indian revolutionaries living in Afghanistan, as well