a house divided, 1933–73projects undertaken in Qunduz, Balkh and Nangahar therefore under-
mined community self-management and self-reliance, leading to a far
greater degree of central government control and interference.
Once mka began to implement the programme on the ground it ran
into complex, interrelated problems. Geological surveys of the area served
by the Bogra Canal Extension revealed the soil was shallow with a high
water table and poor drainage. The surveyors noted large saline deposits
on the surface, which increased as the canal was constructed and the water
table rose. mka then discovered that the existing compacted mud diversion
dam was incapable of delivering water to the tail of the network during low
flow periods, so mka decided to build bigger and better concrete struc-
tures. As a consequence the costs of the Bogra scheme tripled, but this
was just the beginning of mka’s woes. In an attempt to address increasing
salinity, seepage, fluctuations in river level and seasonal inundations, mka
recommended the construction of two huge storage dams at Kajaki on
the Helmand and Dahla on the Arghandab and proposed postponing all
engineering works until a basin-wide impact survey had been completed.
The estimate for these additional interventions was $63.7 million, of which
$53.7 million was in foreign exchange.
By 1949 the Afghan government had paid mka $21.3 million, yet after
almost four years the Bogra Extension had still not come on line. By this
time completion of the project had become a matter of national honour
for the Afghan government, while the reputation of mka and the usa too
were on the line. Zabuli’s personal and political credibility was at stake
as the hvis consumed most of Afghanistan’s foreign exchange credits,
yet the vision of Eden-in-Asia was no nearer realization. Since neither
the Afghan government nor mka dared to abandon the scheme, more
and more money was poured into the project and Afghanistan became
increasingly indebted.
The government approved mka’s recommendation for the storage
dams but the company was told to prioritize completion of the Bogra
system. In 1949 Zabuli requested a further loan of $55 million from the
u.s. Export-Import Bank to cover the additional expenditure, but the bank
approved only $21 million. Since this was less than half the funds needed,
Zabuli scrapped the West Marja secondary canal and the geological and
impact survey. mka, feeling it was politically unacceptable to oppose the
cuts, agreed, only for the downscaling to make matters worse. When water
finally flowed down the Bogra network in the spring of 1950, seepage from
the unlined beds led to a dramatic rise in the water table and salinity levels,
which withered newly planted crops. Since the Bogra canal and diversion