afghanistanTreaty Organization (seato) in September 1954; in February the following
year Pakistan also became a member of the Central Treaty Organization
(cento), which included Turkey, Iraq and Iran. 34 These treaties were
Anglo-American initiatives designed to counteract Soviet influence in Asia
and the Middle East, and included mutual defence agreements as well as
guarantees that contracting parties would defend the ‘inviolability’, ‘integ-
rity’ and ‘sovereign or political independence’ of member states. In 1956
seato formally recognized the Durand Line as the international frontier
of Pakistan and Afghanistan, despite protests by the Afghan government.
Even more alarming, as far as Kabul was concerned, the treaties meant
that the usa and Britain began to rearm Pakistan with modern weapons,
including ground-to-air missiles.
Afghanistan had not been invited to join seato or cento and Afghan
officials interpreted this as a sign that America and Britain were siding with
Pakistan. Yet one of the reasons why Afghanistan had not been included
was Da’ud’s intransigence over Pushtunistan. The u.s. State Department
was keen to encourage cooperation between Afghanistan, Pakistan and
Iran, since it was the u.s. administration’s opinion that the three nations
would present a strong front against Soviet infiltration and potential
aggression. To this end State Department officials urged Afghan ministers
to negotiate unconditionally with Pakistan over the Pushtunistan issue, but
Da’ud refused to compromise. Since the Afghan government had voted
to repudiate the Durand Line as its international frontier and abrogated
the Anglo-Afghan Treaties, it was not possible for both Afghanistan and
Pakistan to be members of seato-cento until the dispute was resolved.
The Afghan government’s intransigence frustrated State Department
officials who regarded the Pushtunistan issue as a ‘seemingly hopeless
stumbling block’ and ‘wasting deadlock’. 35
Another reason for Afghanistan’s exclusion from seato-cento had
been the State Department’s assessment, which concluded the Afghan
government was unstable, the army ineffective and the country in the
grip of a deepening economic crisis. In the circumstances the United States
was not prepared to guarantee to defend Afghanistan from outside aggres-
sion. America had already burnt its fingers badly with the Helmand Valley
Scheme and neither the State Department nor the Pentagon had any desire
to put their hands any deeper into the furnace. In effect, the United States
refused to assume the mantle of Britain, the former Imperial power, or
become embroiled in a new Great Game with the ussr in Afghanistan.
Instead, the usa opted for the pre-1830 situation with the Indus, not the
Amu Darya, as their South Asian Rubicon.