afghanistan
As the government increasingly lost control of the political situation,
the economic crisis was exacerbated by the worst natural disaster in living
memory. From the spring of 1969 to the autumn of 1972 the winter snows
and spring rains, the source of all of Afghanistan’s rivers, failed. The conse-
quences were devastating. There was insufficient water for irrigation and
the water table on lalmi rain-fed land, the primary land for growing wheat
in northern Afghanistan, dropped dramatically. Soon domestic wells began
to dry up, crops failed, and fruit trees and vines withered, while domes-
tic animals died from thirst or had to be slaughtered. The mountainous
regions of western and northwestern Afghanistan were particularly hard
hit, as were the Durrani and Ghilzai nomads in southwestern Afghanistan.
By the spring of 1971 Prime Minister ‘Abd al-Zahir admitted the coun-
try urgently needed more than half a million tons of wheat just to keep
drought-affected populations alive. A survey conducted in the follow-
ing year reported that nearly a quarter of a million people, or more than
one-third of the population of the provinces of Herat, Faryab, Badghis,
Jauzjan, Ghur and Uruzgan, were on the edge of starvation.
The government had no experience in natural disaster management
and its response was patchy, uncoordinated and marred by incompetence.
Eventually, in August 1971 ‘Abd al-Zahir swallowed his pride and petitioned
the u.s. State Department for the immediate provision of 100,000 tons
of wheat. Robert G. Neumann, the Austrian-born u.s. ambassador, who
had spent two years in a Nazi concentration camp and knew the meaning
of hunger, persuaded the State Department to double the tonnage. The
World Food Programme, Canada, China, Germany, Turkey, France and
the European Economic Community contributed a further 100,000 tons of
wheat. Food-for-work programmes were started, fertilizer distributed and
new strains of drought-resistant seed introduced. However, the usa refused
a request for a moratorium on the repayment of Afghanistan’s debt, citing
statutory grounds. The country therefore had to continue payments despite
not being able to afford to buy enough food to keep its population alive.
For the first time non-governmental organizations were allowed to
supervise the local distribution of food aid, and thousands of people were
saved from starvation owing to the heroic efforts of American Peace Corps
volunteers and Christian relief workers. The relief effort faced immense
logistical challenges as it attempted to deliver large supplies of food aid to
some of the most inaccessible mountain communities in Afghanistan. The
few roads into Ghur, Badghis and the Hazarajat able to take motorized vehi-
cles were unpaved, badly maintained, extremely dangerous and barely wide
enough for cars, let alone trucks. Depending on weather conditions, the
nandana
(Nandana)
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