a house divided, 1933–73power was ‘no more than an outside possibility’ and the State Department’s
response to the questions was a bland statement about America’s non -
interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. A few weeks later Neumann’s
informers told him some members of the royal family supported Da’ud’s
return to power and that Shah Wali Khan was attempting to reconcile
the king and Da’ud – for the cousins had not been on speaking terms for
months. At the same time that Da’ud was seeking tacit American support
for his coup, he was also discussing a power-sharing deal with Babrak
Karmal’s Parcham.
A few months later, the u.s. government weakened its position further
when John Connally, who had just stepped down as Secretary to the
Treasury, informed the government during a visit to Kabul that America
would no longer make direct loans to the country. Instead, Afghanistan
should apply for funds to Iran, America’s most strategic ally in the region.
Connally’s position reflected the prevailing Nixon Doctrine, which
regarded the Shah of Iran as the main bulwark against Communism in
the region, but neither President Nixon nor Connally appears to have
had any idea of the long-standing rivalry that existed between Iran and
Afghanistan. Prime Minister ‘Abd al-Zahir had no wish to strengthen his
opponents by appearing to go cap in hand to the Shah, let alone risk Iran
using the provision of aid money to demand concessions over the un -
resolved dispute in Sistan or influence Afghanistan’s foreign policy. In the
autumn of 1972 ‘Abd al-Zahir could take no more and stepped down. In his
letter of resignation he apologized to the king for his government’s failure
to solve the nation’s many problems, an expression of regret unprecedented
in Afghan political life, but one that was long overdue.
The premiership of Musa‘ Shafiq and the fall of King Zahir ShahThe king was abroad at the time and postponed accepting Zahir’s resig-
nation until he returned from his tour of Europe. Finally, in December he
appointed the Foreign Minister, Musa‘ Shafiq, as the new premier. Shafiq,
a Shinwari and a graduate of al-Azhar, was a monarchist with links to the
Islamist parties, though he was more reform-minded than Niyazi and his
circle. Shafiq’s cabinet included representatives of various factions includ-
ing Da’udists, associates of Maiwandwal, as well as Islamists. There were
also several representatives of ethnic and religious minorities, including
‘Abd al-Wahid Sarabi, a Hazara who was probably a covert member of
Sho‘la-yi Jawed, and Muhammad Khan Jalallar, the son of an Uzbek refugee
from Ferghana, who had links to Parcham. 54