a house divided, 1933–73before the onslaught but more than six hundred government troops and
rebels died in the campaign, including the governor and qazi of Parwan
province. 17 The government then publicly accused Pakistan of funding
the ‘saboteurs’ and rounded up dozens of its political enemies. A few
months later Da’ud reshuffled his cabinet, sacking several pdpa ministers
and replacing them with Muhammadzais and ministers who had formerly
served under Zahir Shah. A number of royalist political prisoners were
released and Shah Wali Khan and ‘Abd al-Wali Khan were allowed to join
the ex-king in Italy. Meanwhile, in Peshawar the Islamists squabbled over
whether to continue the armed struggle. Eventually Hikmatyar split from
the others and set up his own militia, Hizb-i Islami, and continued the
armed resistance against Da’ud’s government.
The debt crisis and President Da’ud’s appeal to Western
and Arab nationsIn November 1974 the u.s. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, paid a flying
visit to Kabul and during a brief meeting Na‘im again asserted his govern-
ment’s wish for closer relations with the usa, only for Kissinger to remind
him that u.s.-Afghan relations could not be improved if the government
continued to pursue the Pushtunistan issue. In July of the following year
Na‘im flew to Washington, where he had an audience with President Ford
and expressed his concern about Communist influence in the military.
Afghanistan, he told President Ford, did not want to be ‘too close’ to the
ussr or ‘be gripped by a small percentage of people who are in the services
of a foreign power’. 18 Da’ud, Na‘im and other ministers also embarked on a
tour of nato and Arab capitals. When Da’ud attended the funeral of King
Faizal of Saudi Arabia, he made ostentatious show of his Islamic creden-
tials by performing Hajj. In a subsequent visit to Iraq, he also visited the
Shi‘a holy sites in Najaf.
Da’ud’s belated attempt to win the support of America, the Western
world and pro-American Arab states to counteract the power of the pdpa
was not motivated solely by political expedience, but by the unresolved
economic and fiscal crisis. Afghanistan by this time was deeply in debt
to the ussr to the tune of $1.5 billion as well as owing the usa substantial
sums. Yet despite being barely able to repay its international debt, the
government had agreed to an ambitious Seven Year Plan that was estimated
to cost $3 billion. Moscow, fearing Afghanistan was about to default on its
debt repayment, was only prepared to contribute $500 million to the Plan,
so Da’ud hoped that Western nations and the oil-rich Gulf States might