a house divided, 1933–73instructed the Pakistan media to suspend its anti-Afghanistan propaganda.
Da’ud took the opportunity of the thaw in relations to invite Bhutto to make
a state visit to Afghanistan. When the two men met in June 1976 they struck
up a rapport that dispelled some of the distrust that had existed between
the two governments since 1947. In a public statement issued at the end of
their meetings, both parties announced they had agreed to refrain from
hostile propaganda. Bhutto accepted that there were ‘political differences’
between the two countries, while President Da’ud dropped the demand
that Pakistan release nal prisoners before further talks could be held over
the Pushtunistan issue and accepted Bhutto’s invitation to visit Islamabad.
In a speech at the state banquet held in Bhutto’s honour, Da’ud declared
that ‘on our side the door for talks and understanding is always open for
reaching a final settlement regarding the prevailing political difference
between the two countries’. 21 Theodore L. Eliot Jr, the new u.s Ambassador,
reported to the State Department that ‘after being adamant all his life on
the issue of Pushtunistan, Daoud (sic) has given a clear signal of change
of heart. We believe it improbable this issue can ever again be viewed in
Afghanistan in quite the same way.’ 22
A month later, President Da’ud avoided any specific reference to
Pushtunistan during his Republic Day broadcast. When Da’ud arrived in
Islamabad in August he was greeted by Pushtun tribesmen, who danced
all along the route of his cavalcade. The Pakistani press hailed his visit
as a ‘major breakthrough’, while Eliot triumphantly informed the State
Department that Da’ud’s meeting with Bhutto had caught the ‘Russians
and their local adherents... somewhat off balance’.
Da’ud and the confrontation with the ussr and the pdpaThe growing rapprochement with Iran and Pakistan was not well received
by pdpa members in the government, who accused Da’ud of betraying the
Revolution. Da’ud responded by arresting the more vociferous critics and
sending others into exile as ambassadors to distant countries. Da’ud’s shift
into the Western camp was also duly noted in Moscow. The Kremlin was
particularly upset about the Iranian loan and the proposed Kabul–Tehran
rail link, which, if it went ahead, would provide Afghanistan with an alter-
native overland route for imports and exports and a consequent loss to the
ussr of transit fees and political influence. The fact that Da’ud had earlier
refused a Soviet request to extend its railhead at Hairatan to Mazar-i Sharif
did not help Afghan-Soviet relations either. Another source of foreign
exchange for the Soviet Union was the sale of diesel, petrol and aviation