afghanistana matter of months. The prospect of a second militant Islamic govern-
ment on the ussr’s southern frontiers was unacceptable to Moscow, for
in April the Shah of Iran had been forced into exile and Iran was now a
Shi‘a Republic ruled by Ayat Allah Khomeini. So when President ’Amin
requested limited Soviet military support against the mujahidin, who
had overrun Badakhshan, he unwittingly provided the Kremlin with the
justification it sought to send in the Red Army.
On 12 December 1979 Brezhnev and his inner circle met to discuss
possible military intervention in Afghanistan. Before them lay a proposal
by Babrak Karmal to depose Hafiz Allah ’Amin, which included assurances
by Karmal that he ‘enjoyed the support of a significant part of Afghan Party
members and the population’. The Afghan nation, he declared, ‘were only
waiting for him to show up in their country in order to act against Amin’. 38
However, Babrak then went on to state that the coup could only be success-
ful if it had the support of the Soviet military. Despite Marshal Orarkov,
Chief of the General Staff, and other senior military officers being absent
from the meeting, Brezhnev gave the order to mobilize the 40th Army
Corps in preparation for a full-scale intervention. When he was informed
of the decision, Marshal Orarkov tried to persuade his political masters
to revoke their decision to invade, but was curtly told to obey orders and
leave policy-making to the Politburo. 39
A few days later a high-ranking kgb officer flew into Bagram airbase
with secret instructions to organize the assassination of Hafiz Allah ’Amin
and to prepare for the arrival of Soviet forces. Over the next few days,
Babrak Karmal and Anahita Ratebzad were flown in along with hundreds
of kgb special forces personnel, including the Muslim Battalion, which
consisted of Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turkmans dressed in Afghan army
uniforms. Several attempts to kill President ’Amin failed, however, and
Babrak Karmal and Anahita Ratebzad were flown back to Tashkent.
Meanwhile, Moscow lulled President ’Amin into a sense of false security
by informing him that the military build-up was in response to his request
for military support against the mujahidin.
On 23 December 1979, while the Western world was occupied with
its Christmas shopping spree, kgb units took control of Bagram and at
0400 hours on Christmas morning fleets of Antonov cargo planes began
to land at Kabul airport, where they unloaded troops, tanks and armoured
personnel carriers. The approaches and perimeter of the airport were soon
secured, while kgb agents and Soviet military officers already in Kabul
occupied key military positions and anti-aircraft defences. kgb officials
even persuaded ’Amin to allow the Muslim Brigade and kgb special units