a house divided, 1933–73had risen to $325 million and by 1987 this figure had almost doubled to $630
million. 47 In contrast, in the 33 years between 1946 and 1979 the usa invested
a total of $532 million in development grants and loans for civil projects in
Afghanistan, or an average of $16 million per annum. 48 The cia demanded
only minimal accountability from the isi and its Afghan clients for expendi-
ture and the isi’s record keeping of the distribution of military equipment
was almost non-existent. As far as the cia was concerned, once the arms
and cash were in the hands of isi operators, they were no longer respon-
sible, legally or morally, for the use to which they were put. In this way, the
cia was able to distance itself from actions by isi clients that violated the
Agency’s terms of reference and u.s. law. The cia was therefore able to deny
any involvement when Afghan mujahidin, trained by isi agents, attacked
Indian-held Kashmir or fomented uprisings in Soviet Uzbekistan, Tajikistan
and Turkmenistan. It also created a culture of impunity and corruption on
an unprecedented scale, with everyone from the isi and Pakistani govern-
ment officials to mujahidin commanders creaming off large percentages, a
culture that Afghan refugees referred to as ‘the Pakistan Disease’. 49
To raise additional funds for the war effort, commanders inside
Afghanistan demanded payment from rival mujahidin in exchange for safe
passage and, encouraged by antiquity dealers in Peshawar and Iran, they
A mine awareness poster, Khost. During the Soviet occupation millions of anti-personnel
mines and booby trap devices were scattered all over the country. Thousands of mujahidin
and civilians were killed or maimed as a result. More than 25 years after the Soviet
withdrawal, Unexploded Ordinance (uxos) continue to cause many deaths and injuries.