‘between the dragon and his wrath’, 1994–2017that was tantamount to sacrilege. It was as if an Italian presidential candi-
date had wrapped himself in the Shroud of Turin in an attempt to secure
th e Catholic vote. Following this dramatic gesture, Mullah ‘Omar became
increasingly reclusive, living in close proximity to the relic and allowing
only his most trusted advisers to be admitted to his presence.
The Taliban’s unexpected military successes dealt a serious blow to
Hikmatyar’s military machine. Faced with political oblivion and defeat,
he finally agreed to come to Kabul and share power with Rabbani and
Mas‘ud – a decision equivalent to boarding the Titanic after it had struck
the iceberg. In late June 1996, when Hikmatyar finally arrived in Kabul,
he was greeted by another devastating barrage of rockets from the Taliban
forward positions. Hikmatyar’s presence in the capital, however, exacer-
bated the already toxic relationship between himself and Ahmad Shah
Mas‘ud. Within a matter of weeks, the two men were at loggerheads. When
in August the Taliban overran Hizb-i Islami bases in Paktiya and Paktika,
Mas‘ud refused to send reinforcements to defend these outposts. The
decision was tactically correct, since to have done so would have over-
stretched his resources and made Kabul vulnerable to an assault by the
Taliban. Furthermore, Mas‘ud realized that sending thousands of heavily
armed Panjshiris into the southern tribal belt would be deeply resented
by Pushtun tribal leaders and inevitably lead to more defections to the
Taliban. Instead, Mas‘ud strengthened the defences at Sarobi, Hikmatyar’s
last stronghold and the gateway to Kabul from the east, as well as the back
door to the Panjshir and Koh Daman. Hikmatyar, however, was deeply
displeased at Mas‘ud’s decision, claiming that the Panjshiri leader was
deliberately avoiding supporting Hizb-i Islami positions in an attempt to
weaken his militia even further.
On 11 September 1996 Jalalabad fell to the Taliban without a fight,
amid rumours that Hajji Qadir, head of the Nangahar shura, had agreed
to surrender the town in return for several million dollars and safe passage
to Pakistan. A few days later, the Taliban overran Kunar and Laghman
and pushed on up the Kabul–Jalalabad highway. On 24 September they
reached Sarobi where they launched a surprise night assault on the weakest
section of Mas‘ud and Hikmatyar’s front line. Hundreds of ghazis volun-
teered to walk through the protecting minefield, blowing up the mines
and themselves in the process, but in so doing they cleared a path for
military vehicles and the infantry. Caught off guard, Mas‘ud’s men fought
bravely only to flee after Hikmatyar’s militia turned their guns on them
and joined the Taliban.